Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Testimony by Sandra Guerra Thompson
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 102 | Issue 2 Article 2
Spring 2012
Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness
Testimony
Sandra Guerra Thompson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Testimony, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 329 (2013).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol102/iss2/2
0091-4169/12/10202-0329 
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 102, No. 2 
Copyright © 2012 by Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A. 
329 
JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING OF POLICE-




This Article urges a fundamental change in the administration of 
criminal justice.  The Article focuses on what I call “police-generated 
witness testimony,” by which I mean confessions, police informants, and 
eyewitness identifications.  These types of testimony are leading causes of 
wrongful convictions.  The Article shows that heavy-handed tactics by the 
police have a tendency to produce false evidence of these types, especially 
when the individuals being questioned by police are particularly 
vulnerable, such as juveniles or those who are intellectually disabled or 
mentally ill.  It also demonstrates that there are procedural best practices 
that the police can follow to reduce the dangers of false evidence.   
The most important feature of the Article is the proposal that courts 
take an active role in ensuring the reliability of evidence in criminal trials 
by invoking their gatekeeping responsibilities in screening police-generated 
evidence by holding pretrial reliability hearings.  Current federal 
constitutional doctrine fails to exclude patently unreliable police-generated 
testimony.  State high courts can invoke their state due process laws, as was 
recently done in a seminal New Jersey case on eyewitness identification.  
However, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 already gives trial courts broad 
discretion to exclude evidence on the grounds that its potential to mislead 
the jury substantially outweighs its probative value.  Reliability hearings for 
lay witness testimony already exist in criminal cases for some types of 
evidence (mostly defense evidence), and they are also clearly required for 
expert scientific evidence.  Moreover, effective gatekeeping is consistent 
with the objectives of the rules of evidence, not to mention ethical 
requirements that judges secure the integrity of the trial process. 
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Director, University of Houston Law Center.  The author represented the Texas public law 
schools as a member of the Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions for the 
state legislature (2009–2010).  She owes a debt of gratitude to Brandon Garrett, Keith 
Findley, Richard Leo, Alexandra Natapoff, and Myrna Raeder for their insightful comments 
on earlier drafts of the Article.  Brooke Sizer and Michaiah Chatman provided excellent 
research assistance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Wrongful convictions prove that sometimes verdicts of guilty “beyond 
a reasonable doubt” are dead wrong.
1
  Erroneous guilty verdicts often rest 
on three types of central—and often unreliable—lay witness testimony: 
eyewitness identification testimony, police officer testimony regarding a 
defendant’s confession, and a police informant’s
2
 testimony regarding a 
defendant’s incriminating statements.
3
  Unlike other lay witness testimony, 
 
1 As of this writing, a total of 300 men have been exonerated by means of DNA 
evidence.  News and Information: Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exoneration, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_
Exonerations.php (last visited October 10, 2012).  Seventeen death sentences have been 
overturned on account of DNA evidence.  Id.  Other studies suggest that the actual numbers 
of wrongful convictions, most of which cannot be discovered by means of DNA or other 
exculpatory evidence, are much greater.  In fact, studies suggest that thousands of people are 
wrongly convicted of felonies each year.  See Richard A. Wise, Clifford S. Fishman & 
Martin A. Safer, How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case, 
42 CONN. L. REV. 435, 440–41 (2009); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United 
States: 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523–24 (2005). 
2 This Article addresses police informants generally, as opposed to in-custody or 
“jailhouse” informants, who are the sole focus of some statutes and reform proposals.  The 
problems surrounding the use of police informants are as important for those not in custody, 
and perhaps even more so.  See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS 
AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 177–78 (2009). 
3 Misleading and false forensic evidence is also a contributing factor in a significant 
number of wrongful conviction cases.  See Understand the Causes: Unreliable or Improper 
Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/
Forensic-Science-Misconduct.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).  Forensic expert testimony is 
already ostensibly subject to reliability screening.  Thus, this article focuses only on critical 
police-generated lay witness testimony. 
Studying DNA exonerations allows us to learn about the extent to which eyewitness 
identification, false confessions, and informant testimony seem to be recurring causes of 
wrongful convictions.  Erroneous eyewitness identification played a role in approximately 
75% of the wrongful convictions.  Understand the Causes: Eyewitness Misidentification, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-
Misidentification.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).  False confessions are present in 25% of 
the cases, and false informant testimony is present in 15%.  See Understanding the Causes: 
False Confessions, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-
Confessions.php (last visited October 10, 2012); Understanding the Causes: Informants, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Snitches-Informants.php 
(last visited October 10, 2012).  Studies have also found that perjured testimony by police 
informants is a leading cause of wrongful death sentences, appearing in 45.9% of all 
documented wrongful convictions by one estimate, resulting in 51 wrongfully imposed death 
sentences.  See CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, THE 
SNITCH SYSTEM: HOW SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER INNOCENT 
AMERICANS TO DEATH ROW 3, available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongful
convictions/issues/causesandremedies/snitches/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf.  Frequently, 
wrongful convictions are based on more than one source of faulty evidence at the same time.  
See Understand the Causes: The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
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police-generated testimony
4
 in criminal cases is often rendered unreliable 
by suggestive or coercive police conduct or by police incentives to lie.
5
  
This is a critical factor that distinguishes other forms of testimonial 
evidence from this type of evidence.  The role of the police in procuring 
these statements is a critical factor in assessing the reliability of 
confessions, informant testimony, and eyewitness identifications. 
In an important sense, the evidence can be viewed as the product of 
the interaction between the individual, on the one hand, and the police 
investigator on the other.  These types of evidence are not simply “found” 
in the way that a murder weapon may be found at a crime scene.  Instead, a 
piece of these types of police-generated witness testimony may be likened 
to trace evidence, in that it must be carefully collected and processed in 
order to make accurate determinations.  It is the interaction of the 
investigator with the individual giving statements that ultimately produces 
relevant evidence, and improper handling can contaminate or destroy the 
evidence.
6
  Extensive studies have shown the effects that certain law 
 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/.  For a repository of information on wrongful 
convictions, see id. 
These causes of wrongful convictions can occur at dramatically different rates in 
different kinds of cases, however.  For example, erroneous identifications have been found in 
almost 90% of all rape exonerations, but only half of the homicides.  Gross et al., supra note 
1, at 542.  Since DNA evidence is present in sexual assault cases far more often than in other 
types of crimes, wrongful rape convictions are far more likely to result in exonerations than 
other types of crimes.  Id. at 530–31.  Thus, considering DNA exonerations alone gives a 
skewed impression of how often mistaken identifications cause wrongful convictions.  In 
murder cases, for example, the more common cause appears to be deliberate false testimony 
by a jailhouse snitch, the real perpetrator, or even the police or forensic scientists.  Id. at 
542–43.  We can be certain of two things: huge numbers of wrongful convictions have 
occurred, and most will never be discovered.  Id. at 533. 
4 For purposes of this Article, I will refer to three types of evidence—confessions, 
informant testimony, and eyewitness identification testimony—as “police-generated” 
evidence.  There are clearly other types of testimonial evidence that may be generated by the 
police, such as alibi-negating witnesses or witnesses offering forensic evidence.  This Article 
only compares three such types of evidence that have received the most attention from 
scholars and reformers. 
In addition, to avoid confusion, I do not refer to the persons making the statements that 
have evidentiary value as “witnesses.”  In the case of confessions and informants, it is 
generally the police interrogator or informant who testifies to the incriminating statements, 
not the defendant who actually makes the incriminating statements.  Thus, the “witness” in 
the case of confessions or informants is the police officer or informant.  With eyewitness 
identifications, the person making the statements is also the witness in court. 
5 See infra Part II.A. 
6 The memories of eyewitnesses are extremely fragile and easily distorted by improper 
police practices.  See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.  The interrogation process 
can also “contaminate” the evidence of a suspect’s statements if interrogators feed details of 
the crime to the suspect who then repeats them back to the interrogators.  In the case of 
particularly vulnerable suspects, these details may become part of the suspect’s false 
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enforcement practices can have in rendering police-generated witness 
testimony of these three types unreliable.
7
  Reliability concerns have even 
led a few jurisdictions to prohibit death sentences based solely on these 
types of evidence.
8
  Thus, a major contribution of this Article is to 
catalogue the ways in which all three of these types of prosecution evidence 
can be rendered substantially more unreliable by strong-armed police 
tactics, especially when they are employed against individuals who are 
particularly vulnerable, such as minors and the intellectually disabled or 
mentally ill. 
A number of proposals have called on trial courts to play a 
gatekeeping role for police-generated witness testimony that mirrors the 
role they ostensibly play in screening scientific evidence for reliability as 
outlined by the Supreme Court in Daubert.
9
  Just as with forensic evidence, 
 
memories that are created during the interrogations.  See infra note 68.  The gathering of 
information from potential informants can also produce contaminated evidence if the 
informant is told the details of the crime for which the police seek testimony.  See infra notes 
76–81 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 143–80 and accompanying text. 
8 Illinois had a unique provision that allowed a trial court to decertify a case as a capital 
case “if the court finds that the only evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction is the 
uncorroborated testimony of an informant witness . . . concerning the confession or 
admission of the defendant or that the sole evidence against the defendant is a single 
eyewitness or single accomplice without any other corroborating evidence.”  720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/9-1(h-5) (2011).  The provision is no longer needed in Illinois since the death 
penalty was recently repealed.  See Illinois Pub. Act 096-1543, available at 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=096-1543.  Nonetheless, the 
corroborating evidence requirement provides a useful exemplar. 
In Maryland, a person may not be sentenced to death based solely on the testimony of 
eyewitnesses.  The State must present the court or jury with “(i) biological evidence or DNA 
evidence that links the defendant to the act of murder; (ii) a videotaped, voluntary 
interrogation and confession of the defendant to the murder; or (iii) a video recording that 
conclusively links the defendant to the murder.”  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. L. § 2-202(a)(3) 
(LexisNexis 2011).  See also Michael Millemann, Limiting Death: Maryland’s New Death 
Penalty, 70 MD.  L. REV. 272, 272 (2010) (describing Maryland’s death penalty laws as the 
most restrictive in the country). 
9 See infra notes 236–45 and accompanying text.  Daubert announced judicial 
gatekeeping to ensure the reliability of scientific evidence.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 536 U.S. 137 (1999) 
(applying Daubert reliability standard to expert witnesses offering technical evidence).  In 
the civil context, Joseph Sanders views Daubert as evidence that American courts have 
“taken smaller steps toward reducing the untoward effects of the adversarial selection of 
witnesses” and “pushed courts in the United States toward a slightly more inquisitorial 
posture . . . .  The era of a totally passive judiciary slowly ended after the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, and, since Daubert, the federal judiciary and the courts in many 
states have adopted a more active, inquisitorial posture in assessing the quality of a party’s 
experts.”  Joseph Sanders, Science, Law, and the Expert Witness, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 63, 78 (2009). 
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there are best practices for gathering and preserving these types of evidence.  
Laboratory protocols guide the scientist, and standardized protocols can 
guide law enforcement in gathering and preserving eyewitness 
identification evidence, confessions during custodial interrogations, and the 
use of police informants.
10
  If investigators “contaminate” the evidence by 
using suggestive or coercive practices, it is within the province of the trial 
judge to exclude the resulting evidence as too unreliable or to devise a less 
drastic intermediate remedy. 
Unfortunately, the analogy to scientific evidence—another common 
cause of wrongful convictions—suffers from the fact that trial courts 
generally have either been unwilling or unable to perform competent 
reliability screening in criminal cases.
11
  To be fair, reliability in the context 
of scientific evidence presents a more challenging task for courts.
12
  
Evaluating the scientific validity of a proposed expert’s testimony involves 
a complex assessment of the established scientific theory, the accepted 
protocols for obtaining such evidence, and the applicability of the science to 
the facts of the case at bar.
13
  Scientific expertise also comes in a myriad of 
 
10 See infra Part II.B.  On the social science of eyewitness identification, see also Sandra 
Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness 
Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1497–1506 (2008) [hereinafter 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?].  On confessions, see RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE 
INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 237–68 (2008).  On informant testimony, 
sociologists have done more limited research.  See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 40, 111. 
11 Concerns about the failures of Daubert in criminal cases and the admission of 
unreliable forensic evidence abound.  See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE 
FORENSIC SCIENCE CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS. ET AL., 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) 
(finding that a wide range of forensic disciplines lack validity) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE]; Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science 
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 2, 89–90 (2009) (reporting that 
invalid forensic science was offered in 82 of 137 (60%) of wrongful convictions studied; 
courts typically admit prosecution forensic evidence in a highly deferential manner and do 
not provide funds for defense experts).  These concerns have also prompted the suggestion 
that perhaps judges should share the decisionmaking authority for forensic science with 
experts in those fields.  See Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, 
Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 897 (2008). 
12 “Surveys and case law have demonstrated that judges have a poor judicial 
understanding of the Daubert factors, which in many ways requires an unrealistic working 
knowledge of the philosophy of science.”  Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research 
in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L. J. 1263, 1270 (2007). 
13 As Daubert explains, courts are required to evaluate the proposed testimony to 
determine whether it is supported by valid scientific principles.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–
90.  This involves a determination of whether the science is generally accepted in the 
relevant scientific community, whether the results of the testing have been published for peer 
review, whether they are falsifiable, and the error rate.  Id. at 593–94.  In addition, the court 
must evaluate the technique used to put the scientific principles into practice.  Are there valid 
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varieties, and each type of evidence requires the court to assess reliability 
on numerous, complex levels.
14
  Not surprisingly, grave concerns about the 
unscientific nature of much forensic evidence admitted by courts persist.
15
 
It hardly makes sense to propose expanding on a failed model of 
reliability screening.  However, courts are better suited to conduct reliability 
screening for police-generated lay witness testimony.  The term “reliability” 
as used here means simply accuracy, and it operates in reference to the trial 
outcome.  Determining reliability in relation to confessions, eyewitness 
identifications, and informant testimony involves a probabilistic assessment 
of the extent to which a variety of factors known to diminish the accuracy 
of these types of evidence are present in a given case.  Judges can simply 
compare the police procedures followed in the case to state-of-the-art best 
practices that have been developed by law enforcement groups and 
reformers.  A reliability assessment would also necessarily take into 
account any vulnerability factors, and other intrinsic factors pertaining to 




Traditionally, trial courts hold pretrial hearings for confessions and 
eyewitness identification evidence, but only to determine whether it was 
obtained in accordance with the defendant’s constitutional rights.  These 
hearings have not been effective in ensuring the reliability of the evidence.
17
  
A new landmark decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court sets a new 
course for its state due process analysis of eyewitness identifications by 
 
protocols in the field?  Were the protocols followed?  Next, the court must evaluate the 
manner in which the results are interpreted and explained to the jury.  Are the conclusions 
drawn by the expert empirically based?  Finally, the court must determine whether the 
proposed evidence is sufficiently relevant in terms of “fit.”  Does the evidence support an 
issue in question in the case?  Id. at 591.  It goes without saying that a witness’s credentials 
also must be assessed for adequate expertise.  See also Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 11, at 
7–8 (noting that in addition to validity of a particular forensic technique, data must also be 
interpreted, reported, and testified to within appropriate scientific parameters that are 
supported by empirical data). 
14 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93. 
15 See supra note 11. 
16 With regard to both confessions and statements from police informants, for example, 
individuals who are juveniles, intellectually disabled, or mentally ill have been shown to be 
more susceptible to making false statements than others.  See infra notes 69–75 and 
accompanying text.  Likewise, for eyewitnesses, researchers have shown that many factors, 
such as an eyewitness’s age, mental ability, and stress level during the crime, and other 
factors like differences in race between eyewitness and culprit, can affect the ability of the 
eyewitness to make an accurate identification.  See infra notes 106–15 and accompanying 
text.  Some cases may present the “perfect storm” of both particularly vulnerable individuals 
and highly suggestive or coercive police practices, posing an extremely high likelihood of 
unreliability. 
17 See infra Part III.A. 
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requiring pretrial reliability hearings of the type advocated here.
18
  This 
opinion can serve as a template for other states in vastly improving the 
screening of identification evidence and the use of jury instructions.  It also 
sets an important precedent in that it departs entirely from a failed federal 
constitutional test for police-generated lay witness testimony.  It lays the 
responsibility for reliability assessment squarely at the feet of the judiciary 
as a protection for the innocent against wrongful conviction.  In this broader 
sense, it lays the groundwork for a similar departure from the federal 
voluntariness test for confessions and the development of judicial reliability 
screening for informant testimony. 
However, state trial courts need not wait for the supreme courts in 
their states to follow the New Jersey high court’s lead.  The state 
counterparts to the Federal Rules of Evidence also govern reliability.  
Traditionally, we would look to the hearsay rules to guard against the use of 
unreliable hearsay statements.  However, the hearsay rules were drafted 
long before the advent of DNA exonerations brought to light the potential 
unreliability of police-generated evidence.  For most hearsay, the rules 
require proof of certain indicia of reliability.  In contrast, the rules freely 
admit confessions, eyewitness identifications, and informant testimony 
without any reliability screening.
19
   
Fortunately, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence showed the 
foresight to know that specific rules might not always provide sufficient 
protection against evidence that might lead to an inaccurate verdict by 
misleading or confusing the jury or unfairly prejudicing a party.
20
  Thus, 
Rules 701 and 403 vest trial courts with broad discretion to determine 
whether evidence offered by a lay witness is inadmissible on the grounds 
that it presents a high risk of unreliability that may lead to an inaccurate 
verdict.  This approach is consistent with the traditional role of the trial 
judge as evidentiary gatekeeper under Rule 104(a) as well.  As our 
understanding of the dangers of a particular type of evidence may change, 
the rules should be adapted to meet the challenges presented by this new 
information.  The “purpose and construction” provision of the rules calls on 
courts to interpret the rules over time so as to “promote the development of 




Courts have not traditionally held pretrial reliability hearings.  Instead, 
the practice is to leave it to the jury to “find the facts” based on “witness 
 
18 See infra notes 316–25 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 275–92 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 269–72 and accompanying text. 
21 FED. R. EVID. 102. 
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credibility,” among other things.
22
  Witness “credibility” refers to the 
witness’s truthfulness.  However, eyewitnesses who misidentify an innocent 
suspect and police officers who testify to a suspect’s false confession 
usually give truthful testimony.  These witnesses actually believe that the 
defendant is guilty.  The witnesses are “credible” in that they are not lying, 
but their testimony is nonetheless incorrect.  Juries generally do not 
appreciate the ways in which certain police tactics can cause an eyewitness 
to make an honest mistake or to feel pressured to identify a certain person, 
honestly convincing himself of the defendant’s guilt.
23
  Jurors also 
generally do not understand how other tactics can cause an innocent person 
to confess falsely.
24
  Similarly, jurors have been shown to be generally 
ineffective at evaluating the reliability of police informants because they do 
not appreciate the government incentives or coercion likely to cause 
informants to lie, nor do they appreciate the vulnerability of some 
informants in the face of police pressure. 
Pretrial reliability hearings would transform the judicial role from one 
of passively admitting what may be patently unreliable evidence to one that 
involves actively scrutinizing the process by which the police have 
generated the witness testimony.  Jurors already understand that trial courts 
rule on the admissibility of evidence, so freely admitting police-generated 
witness testimony may be assumed to indicate a judicial imprimatur, giving 
jurors a false belief that the judge considers the evidence reliable.  
Moreover, the reliability of police-generated witness testimony cannot 
properly be screened during a trial by a jury.  The issues are better suited to 
a pretrial hearing regarding the conditions under which police interviewed 
the individual, as well as other reliability factors.  As an institutional matter, 
judges through training and experience can develop the required expertise 
that jurors—who are not regular participants in the trial process—cannot.
25
 
Finally, it fits within the adjudicative model already in place for judges 
to pass on the reliability of police-generated evidence.  Courts already grant 
pretrial hearings to consider constitutional challenges to confessions and 
 
22 See generally JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND 
ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 25–44 (2006) (discussing the fact-finding role of the jury 
and the role of the judge in determining questions of law). 
23 See infra note 303 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 303–04 and accompanying text. 
25
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., argued in his classic work, The Common Law, that even though 
facts “do not often repeat themselves in practice,” yet “cases with comparatively small variations 
from each other do,” and when this happens, “A judge who has long sat at nisi prius ought 
gradually to acquire a fund of experience which enables him to represent the common sense of 
the community in ordinary instances far better than an average jury.”   
OLDHAM, supra note 22, at 41. 
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identifications,
26
 as well as the reliability of scientific evidence
27
 and 
problematic types of lay witness testimony.
28
  Moreover, reliability 
determinations do not interfere with a defendant’s right to a jury trial,
29
 but 
rather they would advance the defendant’s right to a fair jury trial. 
The judiciary carries a heightened responsibility to oversee the 
reliability of police-generated witness testimony for several reasons.  For 
one thing, the many discoveries of wrongful convictions, through DNA 
evidence and otherwise, expose only the “tip of an iceberg.”
30
  Wrongful 
convictions scholars have generally agreed that the occurrence of wrongful 
convictions is almost certainly much higher than the occurrence of 
exonerations and that we do not have the means to uncover most of the 
wrongful convictions that occur.
31
  Convictions based on government-
generated witness testimony—now shown to falsely convict scores of 
innocents—impose on the state a new obligation to perform more rigorous 
screening for reliability, and that duty naturally falls to the courts.
32
  Rule 
104(a) outlines the basic duty of trial courts to determine the admissibility 
of evidence,
33
 and Rule 403 grants courts the discretion to exclude evidence 
that carries a grave risk of misleading the jury.
34
  Under these rules, courts 
have the discretion to engage in reliability gatekeeping, especially in light 
of the fact that these particular types of evidence are heavily influenced by 
the police procedures that generate them.
35
  State high courts can invoke 
 
26 See infra note 182 and accompanying text; infra Part III.A. 
27 See supra note 13; infra notes 257–63 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra Part III.B. 
29 A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine the elements of the 
crime, including any fact that increases the maximum punishment.  See OLDHAM, supra note 
22, at 39–40.  Reliability assessments either accrue to the advantage of the defendant by 
excluding evidence, or they admit the evidence and allow the jury to make the ultimate 
decision.  Thus, by ruling on reliability the courts would not take from the jury the authority 
to find the defendant guilty. 
30 See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 62 (2008). 
31 See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, supra note 10, at 1491. 
32 See D. Michael Risinger, Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to 
Allen and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 991, 1020 (2010) (“Viewing the state as having 
more responsibility for harm done directly to the immediate subjects of its acts than for harm 
done indirectly by its failures to act [i.e., to convict the guilty], or by its choices to act one 
way rather than another, has a long tradition, especially in situations where the latter harm is 
done by the subsequent choice of an independent human agent.”).  For an article calling for 
heightened reliability review at the appellate level, see Keith A. Findley, Innocence 
Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 591 (2009). 
33 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993) (explaining 
the trial judge’s responsibility to assess expert scientific testimony under 104(a)). 
34 See id. at 595; see also infra Part IV.B. 
35 See infra Parts IV.B–D. 
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their state due process clauses as well.
36
  Legislatures can play an important 




It bears mention that vigorous reliability screening for police-
generated witness testimony by trial courts does not threaten the viability of 
large numbers of prosecution cases.
38
  While confessions, informant 
testimony, and identification evidence are leading causes of wrongful 
convictions, in the vast majority of cases the identification of the 
perpetrator and the particular details of the crime are not in doubt.  Large 
categories of crimes occur in cases involving people who know each other, 
such as domestic violence cases, or where people are caught red-handed, 
such as drunk-driving and undercover drug cases.  These types of cases—
over 90% of all felonies—tend to be resolved by guilty pleas.
39
  It is only in 
the truly uncertain cases, which comprise a small minority of the total 
caseload, that confession, informant, and eyewitness evidence will require 
reliability assessments.  These are the cases that tend to go to trial and in 
which defendants often reject otherwise lenient plea offers.
40
  In one study 
of the first 200 DNA exonerations, with the exception of nine defendants 
who pled guilty, all the rest were found guilty after trial.
41
  Any serious 
effort to curb wrongful convictions would focus on reforming the 
investigative and trial practices in this small subset of cases. 
Part II of this article demonstrates what I call the “unreliability 
conundrum” in criminal prosecutions.  Students of the problem are now 
familiar with the fact that these three types of testimonial evidence—
confessions, eyewitness identifications, and police informant testimony—
often lead to wrongful convictions.  Yet the law remains unsettled on how 
best to respond.  Surely not every eyewitness identification, confession, or 
police informant is unreliable, but many are.  Calls for strict enforcement of 
 
36 See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications and State Courts as 
Guardians Against Wrongful Conviction, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603, 621–31 (2010) 
[hereinafter Eyewitness Identifications]. 
37 See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 194 (stating that the Illinois statute lists seven 
reliability factors). 
38 See Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143, 
147 (2011). 
39 Id.  This is not to say that a guilty plea assures the actual guilt of the defendant.  The 
mass exonerations in Tulia, Texas, and the Rampart scandal in Los Angeles involved 
hundreds of innocent people who were deliberately framed by corrupt police officers, and 
almost all of them pled guilty.  See Russell D. Covey, Mass Exoneration Data and the 
Causes of Wrongful Convictions (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1881767. 
40 Simon, supra note 38, at 152. 
41 See Garrett, supra note 30, at 74. 
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scientifically proven best practices for the police run up against a strong 
resistance from many within law enforcement.
42
  This part of the Article 
surveys the research on each of these three types of evidence so as to better 
understand the unreliability of each, focusing especially on the ways in 
which the police can exacerbate the unreliability.  It also addresses the 
proposed protocols advanced by scholars and advocacy groups for each of 
the three areas and the extent to which the legal system has implemented 
them. 
Among the proposals put forth by academics and advocacy groups is 
the proposal that trial courts expand their judicial gatekeeping role to 
include pretrial reliability reviews of police-generated witness testimony.  
Part III of the paper examines the support for such pretrial hearings in the 
rules of evidence and Supreme Court case law.  It also reviews two types of 
lay witness testimony in which courts already conduct reliability hearings—
the testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses and young child witnesses 
in sexual assault cases.  Courts have recognized that certain safeguards 
should normally be followed in conducting out-of-court interviews with 
witnesses undergoing hypnosis and with child victims.  Interestingly, these 
recommended procedures bear remarkable similarity to those proposed for 
obtaining police-generated witness testimony.  Thus, there is significant, 
instructive precedent for holding pretrial reliability hearings for important 
prosecution lay witness testimony. 
Finally, in Part IV, the Article argues that trial courts should conduct 
pretrial reliability hearings for police-generated witness testimony.  This 
Part then outlines the various considerations that courts might take into 
account in evaluating the reliability of the three types of evidence 
addressed, using the New Jersey decision on pretrial hearings for 
eyewitness identifications as a model.  This section explains the 
appropriateness of judicial screening of critical lay witness testimony.  
Judges have an ethical obligation to safeguard the integrity of the trial 
process, and they are best situated to develop the necessary expertise in 
these areas of law.  Moreover, passing on reliability does not infringe on the 
 
42 See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, supra note 10, at 1494 (addressing police resistance 
to changes imposed from outside law enforcement); cf. D. Michael Risinger, Innocents 
Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 761, 765 (2007) (addressing resistance to new evidence of innocence by some 
judges and prosecutors); Gross et al., supra note 1, at 525–26 (citing examples of “state 
officials who continue to express doubt about the innocence of exonerated defendants, 
sometimes in the face of extraordinary evidence”).  See generally Daniel S. Medwed, The 
Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. 
REV. 125, 129–31, 150, 157–59 (2004) (examining the institutional and political incentives 
that cause prosecutors to resist claims of innocence). 
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jury’s fact-finding role, a role designed to operate for the defendant’s 
benefit. 
II. THE UNRELIABILITY CONUNDRUM 
The criminal justice system in the United States adheres to an 
adversarial model for investigation and prosecution.
43
  Government agents 
seek to discover criminal wrongdoers and bring them to justice so as to 
keep their communities safe and provide solace to victims.  Arrests and 
convictions take on a special importance as indicators of success in an 
adversarial model of criminal investigation.
44
 
Some scholars have recognized the dangers of an adversarial model of 
criminal investigation.  For example, the wrongful convictions literature has 
highlighted the psychological phenomenon of “tunnel vision” that can occur 
once police investigators come to believe in a particular suspect’s guilt.
45
  
For complex, psychological reasons, police investigators can become blind 
to evidence inconsistent with a suspect’s guilt, and they have a tendency to 
interpret other evidence as supporting their suspect’s guilt.
46
  In an 
adversarial investigative model, a defense attorney is considered a 
hindrance to the police, rather than a person who can assist the police in 
reaching the right result.  The police will have little interest in sharing 
information with a defendant or a defense attorney.  In fact, the police will 
be eager to gather their evidence to the greatest extent possible without the 
involvement of a defense attorney.
47
  Institutional pressures can also lead 
prosecutors to develop tunnel vision about the guilt of persons arrested by 
the police.
48
  In an adversarial system, police and prosecutors control how 
an investigation is conducted, as well as access to relevant evidence, 
thereby putting wrongly accused persons at a serious disadvantage in trying 
to clear their names.
49
  Keith Findley astutely observes that: 
 
43 New concerns about protecting the innocent have caused several scholars to write 
critically of the American adversarial system of law enforcement.  See, e.g., Mary Sue 
Backus, The Adversary System is Dead; Long Live the Adversary System: The Trial Judge as 
the Great Equalizer in Criminal Trials, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 945, 945–50; Findley, supra 
note 11, at 900. 
44 See Findley, supra note 11, at 899 (addressing “[i]nstitutional pressures . . . to catch 
and convict . . . criminals” and “unrealistic public and media expectations . . . in the wake of 
violent and sensationalized crimes”). 
45 For the definitive article on the topic, see Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The 
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WISC. L. REV. 291. 
46 Id. at 326–27. 
47 See Findley, supra note 11, at 898; Findley & Scott, supra note 45, at 323–27. 
48 See Findley, supra note 11, at 898–900.  
49 Id. at 898.  
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While initial investigations must be handled by police, a system that is truly interested 
in protecting the innocent and finding the truth would not make police an arm of the 
prosecution.  Instead, police might be made neutral inquisitors who work for the court 
or both parties, and not just the prosecution.  Police investigative files and crime scene 
evidence would then be made fully available . . . to both parties, with appropriate 
safeguards to protect the safety of sensitive sources of information or the integrity of 
ongoing investigations.  Some European countries do just that—they make the police 
investigative file fully available to both sides.
50
 
Similar concerns about the adversarial nature of evidence gathering in 
the American criminal justice system have moved some to call for greater 
independence of forensic scientists from law enforcement as a means of 
improving the reliability of forensic evidence.
51
  Unfortunately, the 
American adversarial system of criminal justice presents other hazards for 
the innocent, including unequal resources—in particular, access to experts 
and the quality of representation for indigents.
52
  In short, criminal 
investigations that become motivated to build a case against a particular 
individual present grave risks to the wrongly accused. 
The studies of each of the types of evidence addressed here—
eyewitness identifications, confessions, and police informant testimony—
show that each is derived by the police during the initial stages of the 
adversary process.  There are two important dynamics that can operate 
simultaneously, often producing false statements.  First, the police may 
attempt to obtain the statements after they have identified a suspect as a 
means of substantiating their case, rather than seeking the statements as a 
starting point in an investigation.
53
  Police investigators who believe that 
they know the identity of the guilty person will engage in a conversation 
with a person (an eyewitness, a suspect, or a potential informant),
54
 often 
using suggestive or coercive means, in order to obtain the desired 
evidence.
55
  Second, the persons whose statements are obtained by the 
police may be vulnerable individuals who are more susceptible to 
suggestive, misleading, or coercive police behavior.
 56
  The combination of 
the two—police interviewers who believe they have the “correct” answers 
 
50 Id. at 900. 
51 See generally STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 11 (discussing the 
challenges currently facing the forensic community, including the lack of validity in many 
forensic disciplines). 
52 See Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local 
Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 300–01 (2010). 
53 See, e.g., Findley & Scott, supra note 45, at 334 (“[A]n interrogation is conducted only 
when the investigator is reasonably certain of the suspect’s guilt.” (quoting FRED E. INBAU ET 
AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 8 (2001))). 
54 See infra notes 62–65 and accompanying text. 
55 See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
56 See infra notes 69–75, 82, 106–08 and accompanying text.  
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in mind when they interview individuals and individuals who are 
particularly vulnerable to police suggestion or pressure—leads quite 
predictably to false answers. 
Herein lies the reliability conundrum for the legal system: in many 
instances, police-generated witness testimony is reliable, but in other cases 
these critical types of evidence lead to wrongful convictions.  Researchers 
have identified the police practices and other factors that affect the 




The following sections address the literature on the three types of 
police-generated testimonial evidence discussed here.  Each can create a 
risk of wrongful convictions due to the psychological vulnerability of the 
individuals questioned by the police, combined with the suggestive or 
coercive questioning practices of the police.  This part of the Article also 
reviews the best practices for improving the reliability of these types of 
evidence. 
A. PSYCHOLOGICALLY VULNERABLE INDIVIDUALS, DETERMINED 
INVESTIGATORS, AND A PROCESS HIDDEN FROM JUDICIAL 
SCRUTINY 
When a serious crime occurs, the police look for leads and try to 
determine who committed the crime.  For assistance, they turn to 
individuals such as eyewitnesses, “persons of interest,” suspected 
accomplices, low-level criminals from the same community, or cellmates of 
a suspect in the county jail.  Custodial interrogation, eyewitness 
identifications, and informant information are the means by which 
investigators build their cases.  Once the police arrest a suspect, 
eyewitnesses can verify the arrest decision by making a positive 
identification.  To obtain identification evidence, the police ordinarily 
conduct a lineup or photo array to see if the eyewitness can choose the 
suspect from the choices provided.
58
  Alternatively, with on-the-scene 
arrests, the police may conduct a “show up” in which the suspect is the only 
 
57 Reformers have also advocated the use of pretrial reliability hearings.  See infra notes 
237–40 and accompanying text. 
58 Studies of identification practices show that the police generally use these procedures 
only after they have targeted a particular person as a “suspect.”  See, e.g., Bruce W. Behrman 
& Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival 
Analysis, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 475, 475–478 (2001) (providing archival analysis of real 
cases and various factors that affected “suspect identification rates,” or rates at which 
eyewitnesses identified persons who police had singled out as suspects). 
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person shown to the eyewitness.
59
  Once a suspect is in custody, the police 
can interrogate the arrestee to obtain incriminating statements.
60
  They may 
also offer incentives to known criminals who may share a jail cell with the 
suspect.
61
  All of these encounters produce important testimonial evidence 
for the prosecution. 
Richard Leo emphasizes that the American system of police 
interrogation must be understood as an early phase of the adversary system 
and not simply as a neutral fact-finding process.
62
  Leo’s review of 
empirical studies of police detectives shows them to be “anything but 
neutral or impartial in their collection and construction of case evidence 
against criminal suspects during the interrogation process.”
63
  The same can 
be said of the process of eyewitness identification
64
 and the use of 
informants.
65
  Each of these investigative methods too often becomes an 
occasion for individuals to confirm the investigators’ beliefs about a certain 
suspect’s guilt, or simply to provide usable evidence to convict an arrestee, 
rather than being part of a neutral search for truth.  Rather than one-on-one 
conversations between equals, the research shows these investigative 
processes to be police-dominated sessions in which officers use various 
psychological methods of suggestion, persuasion, or coercion. 
 
59 Sandra Guerra Thompson, What Price Justice? The Importance of Costs to Eyewitness 
Identification Reform, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33, 53–54 (2008) [hereinafter What Price 
Justice?] (noting that show-ups may be the most commonly used identification procedure). 
60 A person is considered to be in police “custody” if that person “has been . . . deprived 
of his freedom of action in any significant way.”  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 
(1966).  A lawful arrest is justified on the basis of probable cause to believe the person is 
guilty of a crime.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 
89, 91 (1964)).  Following arrest, the police may engage in a custodial interrogation so as to 
gather sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
449–50. 
61 See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 27–29 (addressing the rewards, such as leniency, cash, 
and even illicit drugs offered to informants who have access to higher level targets of police 
investigations). 
62 See generally LEO, supra note 10, at 9–40. 
63 Id. at 11. 
64 Typically, the police use photo arrays or live lineups as a means of having an 
eyewitness confirm the identification of a suspect who is already in police custody or who is 
a target of the investigation.  Scientists analogize these identification procedures to scientific 
experiments.  In these experiments, “[p]olice investigators are like researchers who have a 
hypothesis (i.e., that the suspect is the culprit), the officer conducting the lineup is like an 
experimenter who administers the materials and ‘runs,’ the eyewitness through the procedure 
. . . .”  Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research 
and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 765–67 (1995). 
65 See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 17–21 (addressing relationship of informant to police 
officer in investigating crimes). 
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When suspects confess falsely, they most often do so “in response to 
police coercion, stress, or pressure in order to achieve some instrumental 
benefit—typically either to terminate and thus escape from an aversive 
interrogation process, to take advantage of a perceived suggestion or 
promise of leniency, or to avoid an anticipated harsh punishment.”
66
  The 
combination of a highly stressful atmosphere in the interrogation room and 
a promise of leniency can wear a suspect down and manipulate him into 
confessing.
67
  In addition, police may also use pressure, tricks, lies, fear, or 
other tactics to convince a person to make incriminating statements that 
may turn out to be false.
68
 
The vulnerability of certain types of suspects increases the likelihood 
of a false confession as well.  Juveniles,
69
 the mentally ill,
70
 and the 
 
66 LEO, supra note 10, at 201–02; see also, e.g., State v. Strayhand, 911 P.2d 577, 583 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (describing interaction between two police detectives and a suspect 
where the police threatened to “hang [the suspect] in court” and that he would do some “big 
time” if he was not cooperative, ignored his request to stop being questioned, accused him of 
lying, and then lied about having a lab report that showed his fingerprints were on the 
vehicle used in the robbery). 
67 LEO, supra note 10, at 148. 
68 Id. at 132–50, 201–04.  One study of cases in which innocent individuals were 
wrongly convicted and later exonerated through DNA evidence found that police had fed the 
facts and details of the crime to the innocent suspects and then reported that the suspects had 
provided these same facts and details as part of their confessions.  See Garrett, supra note 30, 
at 89–90.  Another scholar provides evidence of police dishonesty as testifying witnesses, in 
covering up their wrongdoing, as part of the interrogation process, and even in fabricating 
evidence against innocent people.  See Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police 
Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010).  She proposes an exclusionary rule for unjustified 
“truth-distorting” police lies as a means of protecting the innocent from wrongful 
convictions.  Id. at 45–46. 
69 See LEO, supra note 10, at 231–33.  See generally Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, 
Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257 
(2007) (arguing that problems of false confessions and mistaken identifications by juveniles, 
when combined with procedural shortcomings of juvenile courts, create a heightened risk of 
wrongful conviction); Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: 
Adolescent Development and Police Interrogation, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 53 (2007) 
(addressing suggestibility of children during interrogation, noting relevance of research on 
children as witnesses and victims, and recommending reforms including prohibiting 
coercive, deceptive, or suggestive questioning, as well as videotaping). 
70 Mentally ill persons may confess falsely even without the use of coercive or 
suggestive practices.  Regardless of the reason, it is clear that the confessions of the mentally 
ill are not generally reliable.  See Claudio Salas, Note: The Case for Excluding the Criminal 
Confessions of the Mentally Ill, 2004 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 243, 268–69 (arguing for 
exclusion of all confessions by the mentally ill or mentally disabled persons who are not 
capable of comprehending the Miranda warnings); see also BRANDON L. GARRETT, 
Characteristics of Informant Testimony in DNA Exoneration Cases, in CONVICTING THE 
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG ch. 5, app. (2011), available at 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/convicting_the_innocent/garrett_informants_
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intellectually disabled
71
 have been shown to be more susceptible to coercive 
or deceptive tactics by the police during custodial interrogation.  A recent 
study of youths who have been exonerated by DNA evidence showed that 
of the 103 youth exonerees, 31.1% had falsely confessed.
72
  In another 
study, 43% of all DNA exonerees were mentally ill, mentally retarded, or 
borderline mentally retarded.
73
  For a variety of reasons, intellectually 
disabled suspects may become compliant with the interrogator and willing 
to say what the interrogator wants to hear.
74
  After lengthy interrogations 




With police informants, the typical image is that of a wily criminal 
who would commit perjury to obtain a benefit for himself.  The police may 
be faulted for facilitating the perjury by offering some type of reward for 
the testimony, but they cannot necessarily be faulted for generating the 
testimony.  However, there is another scenario in which the use of police 
informants mirrors the interrogation process.  Police, or even prosecutors, 
may initiate similar government-dominated interviews with potential 
informants as a means of generating evidence about certain individuals they 
believe to be guilty.  Police may attempt to pressure potential informants to 
“cooperate” by means of various types of inducements, including threats of 




appendix.pdf (quoting conflicting and vague victim-eyewitness testimony by psychiatric 
patient in case where defendant, Mark Bravo, was exonerated).   
71 See generally Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, 
Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495 (2002) (presenting 
empirical study showing that mentally retarded suspects do not comprehend the Miranda 
warnings that are designed to protect them and that they have a proclivity to confess falsely). 
72 Joshua A. Tepfer, Laura H. Nirider & Lynda M. Tricarico, Arresting Development: 
Convictions of Innocent Youth, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 904–05 (2010).  The study of 103 
DNA exonerees who were juveniles showed that while 31.1% of all youth exonerees falsely 
confessed, only 17.8% of the 214 adult exonerees had falsely confessed.  In addition, the 
study found that the incidence of false confessions increases as the age of the child 
decreases; of the eleven- to fourteen-year-olds in the study, over half had confessed falsely.  
Id. 
73 See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 
1064 (2010). 
74 See LEO, supra note 10 at 231–34 (discussing the reasons that vulnerable suspects may 
falsely incriminate themselves, including: the effects of low cognitive abilities on their 
susceptibility to manipulation and deception, becoming easily overwhelmed by stress, 
having low self-esteem, being eager to please authority figures, and having distorted 
perceptions due to mental illness). 
75 Id. at 210–11, 231–33.  
76 See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 90 (detailing the facts in United States v. White, 
No. CRIM.A.04-20047-01-K, 2004 WL 2182188, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2004), in which a 
police officer threatened to bring multiple charges and take the individual to jail if he did not 
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Alexandra Natapoff writes of the process of “creating informants” as one 
that “involves the purposeful manipulation of their vulnerability.”
77
 
Informants may be psychologically vulnerable to police pressure due 
to a variety of conditions similar to those observed in the context of 
interrogations.  Natapoff explains the “lopsided power dynamics of the way 
informants are often created in the first place.”
78
  Rather than wily 
negotiators who bargain for rewards on equal footing with the police, 
“[i]nformants can be the most defenseless players in the criminal justice 
drama—those without counsel or education, those with substance abuse 
problems, or those who are otherwise susceptible to official pressure.”
79
  It 
is not uncommon for informants to be juveniles.
80
  The fear of criminal 
punishment and other psychological disadvantages of potential informants 




Even informants without innate vulnerabilities may be susceptible to 
offers of substantial rewards or threats of punishment.  The question would 
be whether the incentives offered by law enforcement were so great as to 
create an unacceptable likelihood that any person would be tempted to 
commit perjury to gain the benefit or avoid the punishment.
82
 
Eyewitnesses conjure up yet another image of police encounters.  The 
stereotypical eyewitness is the good citizen who is a crime victim or simply 
 
cooperate); see also id. at 27–29 (noting that leniency is the most common reward used, but 
others include monetary payment, relocation, new jobs and identities, and even illegally 
provided drugs or permission to engage in criminal conduct).  For data on informant 
testimony regarding rewards offered to them at the trials of persons who were later 
exonerated by DNA evidence, see GARRETT, supra note 70, ch. 5, app.  
77 NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 40.  She quotes a former narcotics agent who bluntly 
explains: 
It is a widely accepted fact that individuals are most vulnerable to becoming cooperative 
immediately following arrest . . . .  [I] learned to “strike” while the “iron is hot.”  Informants will 
often rethink their exposure and decide not to cooperate if given too much time to contemplate 
their decision.  However, a night or two in jail can work for the investigator to help the informant 
decide to cooperate. 
Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
80 See Andrea L. Dennis, Collateral Damage? Juvenile Snitches in America’s “Wars” on 
Drugs, Crime, and Gangs, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1145, 1171–75, 1181–83 (2009) 
(addressing the harms and dangers to children from acting as police informants and 
advocating for an approach that requires government agents to adopt the best-interests-of-
the-child standard when using a child as an informant). 
81 Id. at 40–41. 
82 The test would be similar to the elements of an entrapment defense.  See generally 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 9.8(a), at 530–34 (5th ed. 2010). 
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an eyewitness to a crime.  The police will initially ask the eyewitness to 
describe the culprit and, following an investigation, will ask the eyewitness 
to try to identify a possible suspect.  There is growing public awareness that 
eyewitnesses can be notoriously unreliable in identifying a stranger who 
committed a crime in their presence.  Their primary disadvantage is the 
simple fact that most human beings lack the ability to develop and retain 
accurate memories of the faces of strangers; this deficiency is most acute 
when witnesses view those individuals under the typical circumstances in 
which serious stranger-on-stranger crimes are committed.
83
 
The police can compound any preexisting unreliability of an 
eyewitness’s identification by using suggestive, or even coercive, 
procedures.
84
  In the zeal to build a case, a determined investigator can 
manipulate the collection of eyewitness testimony and cause a witness to 
select the wrong person; an investigator can also give positive feedback that 
 
83 See, e.g., LOFTUS, infra 136–37 (observing that “[i]t seems to be a fact—it has been 
observed so many times—that people are better at recognizing faces of people of their own 
race than a different race”); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, JAMES M. DOYLE & JENNIFER E. DYSART, 
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 106–08 (4th ed. 2007); Kenneth A. 
Deffenbacher, Estimating the Impact of Estimator Variables on Eyewitness Identification: A 
Fruitful Marriage of Practical Problem Solving and Psychological Theorizing, 22 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 815, 819–22 (2008) (discussing studies of effects of heightened stress 
on eyewitness memory); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the 
Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 699–704 (2004) 
(discussing findings that “high levels of stress negatively impact both accuracy of eyewitness 
identification as well as accuracy of recall of crime-related details”); see also Gary L. Wells 
& Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277, 279 (2003) 
(discussing studies on the effects of cross-race identification and lighting conditions).  See 
generally BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE 
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW (1995); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS 
TESTIMONY (1979); Wells & Seelau, supra note 64. 
84 See What Price Justice?, supra note 59, at 50–51 (discussing reform proposals for 
lineup foil selection designed to prevent the suspect from standing out); see also infra notes 
141–42.  Multiple showings of the same suspect to the same witness may contribute to an 
erroneous identification due to a psychological phenomenon known as “unconscious 
transference.”  See LOFTUS, supra note 83, at 142–44; LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 83, at 106–
08; see also Gabriel W. Gorenstein & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Effect of Choosing an Incorrect 
Photograph on a Later Identification by an Eyewitness, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 616, 621 
(1980) (describing a study confirming that once an eyewitness selects an incorrect face, he or 
she is likely to make the same incorrect selection at a later time); Frontline: What Jennifer 
Saw, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dna/interviews/thompson.html 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (providing a transcript of an interview with rape victim Jennifer 
Thompson who reports that even after DNA proved that Bobby Poole was the actual rapist, 
in her mind she continued to see the face of the man she had wrongly accused, Ronald 
Cotton). 
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Police determination to build a case with witness testimony can go far 
beyond merely suggestive procedures and can closely resemble the type of 
determined coercion, and even deception, employed against suspects during 
interrogation.  In more egregious cases, police officers can use outright 
threats, intimidation, and persistence to pressure a witness to identify a 
person the police seek to prosecute.   
A major investigation by the Houston Chronicle uncovered evidence 
of witness intimidation that had provided the only evidence supporting the 
capital murder conviction of Ruben Cantu in 1985.
86
  Cantu was a teenager 
with no criminal record at the time of the murder, which was witnessed 
only by Juan Moreno, a teenager and undocumented immigrant who was 
himself severely injured.  Cantu became the leading suspect in the murder 
after his involvement in a later incident resulting in the non-fatal shooting 
of an off-duty police officer.  The police tried twice with no success to 
obtain a positive identification of Cantu from Moreno by showing him 
photo arrays that included Cantu.
87
  The day after the second attempt, the 
police took the deportable teenage witness to the police station to view a 
third photo array containing Cantu’s photo.
88
  This time Moreno identified 
Cantu.  Years later, according to the newspaper: 
Moreno said he felt compelled to do what the officers wanted, even though he knew it 
was wrong.  “The police were sure it was [Cantu] because he had hurt a police 
officer,” Moreno said in a recent interview.  “They told me they were certain it was 
him, and that’s why I testified.  That was bad to blame someone that was not there.”
89
 
Ruben Cantu never stopped proclaiming his innocence.  He was executed in 
1993.  The prosecutor  regrets seeking the death penalty in a case in which 
the sole eyewitness was able to identify the defendant only after being 
shown the same person’s photo three times.
90
  In retrospect, he now states: 
 
85 See Amy Bradfield Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A 
Meta-Analysis of the Post-Identification Feedback Effect, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 
859, 860 (2006); Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: 
Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 374 (1998); John S. Shaw, III & Kimberley A. McClure, Repeated 
Postevent Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence, 20 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 629, 630–31, 649–50 (1996). 
86 Lise Olsen, Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man? The Cantu Case: Death and Doubt; 
Eyewitness Says He Felt Influenced by Police To Identify the Teen as the Killer, HOUS. 
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“We have a system that permits people to be convicted based on evidence 
that could be wrong because it’s mistaken or because it’s corrupt.”
91
 
In the case of Ricardo Aldape Guerra, both police and prosecutors 
coerced eyewitnesses in order to obtain identification evidence leading to a 
capital murder conviction.
92
  Like Cantu’s case, this case involved the 
shooting of a police officer, but here the shooting was fatal.
93
  Years after 
the conviction, witnesses—who were all innocent bystanders—testified that 
police officers used angry, vulgar language in rejecting their statements 
identifying a different man, not Guerra, as the shooter.
94
  One witness was 
told that the police would take her infant daughter away from her unless she 
cooperated.
95
  She also watched as police officers yelled at her aunt, 
handcuffed her, and put her in a police car.
96
  Another witness was 
threatened with her arrest and that of her husband if she did not cooperate.
97
  
Over twelve years after the conviction, a federal court granted Guerra’s 
petition for the writ of habeas corpus and denounced in the strongest terms 




We have no way of knowing how often the police intimidate witnesses 
into identifying the person the police want them to choose, but the cases of 
Cantu and Guerra demonstrate that it does happen.  Brandon Garrett’s 
research of DNA exonerations shows several instances in which 
eyewitnesses reported feeling pressured to identify a particular person.
99
  
Many of the tactics used with eyewitnesses resemble those used in 
interrogations, such as the use of lengthy detentions as a means of 
 
91 Id. 
92 Guerra v. Collins, 916 F. Supp. 620, 637 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Guerra v. 
Johnson, 90 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1996). 
93 Id. at 623. 
94 Id. at 624–25. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 625. 
98 Id. at 637 (“The police officers’ and the prosecutors’ actions described in these 
findings were intentional, were done in bad faith, and are outrageous.  These men and 
women, sworn to uphold the law, abandoned their charge and became merchants of chaos.”); 
see also People v. Lee, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing conviction 
in part because police coerced eyewitness into identifying defendant by improper threat to 
try eyewitness for murder unless he named defendant as the killer). 
99 See GARRETT, Characteristics of Eyewitness Misidentifications in DNA Exonerees’ 
Trials, in CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG, supra 
note 70, ch. 3, app., available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/
convicting_the_innocent/garrett_eyewitness_appendix.pdf. (cases include Habib Abdal, 
Ulyssess Rodriguez Charles, Thomas Doswell, Jerry Lee Evans, and Michael Evans, among 
others). 
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pressuring them to “name names.”
100
  Other times, witnesses are given 
information (which may or may not be truthful) about certain suspects that 
matches their descriptions of the individuals.  This information signals to 
the witness the officer’s belief in that particular person’s guilt.
101
  
Sometimes the suggestion is so blatant as to make the identification process 
a farce.  In one case the witness was shown the photo of the suspect first 
and then shown a photo array that also included his photo—the equivalent 
of telling a student the answer to a multiple choice question before 
administering the exam question.
102
  If witnesses initially pick a filler 
instead of the suspect, they may be told to try again—clearly 
communicating that the first choice was “wrong” and they should pick one 
of the others.
103
  Like informants, witnesses may even make an 
identification in exchange for some type of reward.
104
  In another extreme 
case, a federal appeals court found that the police officer had “fabricated” a 
lineup by making the defendant’s photo obviously stand out in a photo 
array in order to frame the defendant for failing to cooperate.
105
 
As with suspects and potential informants, the psychological 
vulnerabilities of eyewitnesses being questioned by the police play an 
important role.  In the Guerra case, the witness was held overnight at the 
police station.  The petitioner argued that “in addition to lack of sleep, the 
ability to coerce and intimidate the witnesses was made easy by three other 
factors common to most of the key witnesses, i.e., their inability to speak 
 
100 Id. (Michael Evans case: witness detained for ten hours and pressured to name 
names). 
101 Id. (Jerry Lee Evans case: victim initially described attacker as having a black glove 
with metal-looking spikes, and police told witness after identification that Evans had 
previously been arrested for wearing spiked knuckles; Larry Fuller case: witness told that the 
photo was taken the morning of identification at Fuller’s house and that he had previously 
been imprisoned for armed robbery; Anthony Green case: witness told suspect’s name was 
Tony and she had indicated that assailant had identified himself as Tony). 
102 Id. (Clarence Harrison case).  In the Jerry Lee Evans case, the D.A.’s office later 
described the police as “leading and encouraging” the victim to pick Evans.  Id. (Jerry Lee 
Evans case).  The victim in another case was shown only one photo and then told that the 
police would likely dismiss the case if she did not identify him.  Id. (Peter Rose case).  
Another was told that if she did not identify the suspect in a single-person show-up, he 
would be released, making the investigation more complex because he would be harder to 
locate.  Id. (Eduardo Velasquez case). 
103 Id. (Joe Jones case: filler chosen twice and then wrongly convicted; Larry Mayes 
case: suspect chosen on second attempt). 
104 Id. (Paula Gray case: witness initially did not make an identification, but made the 
identification after police offered assistance and relocation; Willie Rainge case: victim 
initially did not identify suspect, and only did so after offered police relocation). 
105 Id. (Donald Wayne Good case); see also Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
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fluent English, their lack of education, and their youth.”
106
  The court in 
Guerra acknowledged the special vulnerability of juveniles to intimidating 
police tactics.
107
  Cantu’s case also involved the intimidation of a juvenile, 
who was also subject to deportation.
108
 
As the research in the area of false confessions shows, juveniles and 
those with an intellectual disability or mental illness have a greater 
likelihood of succumbing to police intimidation.
109
  In addition, the research 
on eyewitness identifications shows that these groups are also less likely to 
be reliable eyewitnesses.  Children and the elderly,
110
 mentally disabled 
persons, and persons on certain medications, intoxicants, or controlled 
substances
111
 are less likely to provide accurate identification evidence.  
Their sensory disadvantage exists regardless of the methods employed by 
investigators.
112
  If suggestive or coercive tactics are used, the likelihood of 
misidentification is necessarily compounded. 
In addition, researchers have observed that being the victim of a 
violent crime can cause a witness to experience an intense fear that can 
cause lasting psychological damage.  Witnesses “often report having been 
really frightened, sometimes admitting that they do not remember much 
detail about what occurred in the frightening situation, even on rare 
occasion admitting to symptoms persisting for weeks, at least, symptoms 
resembling those characteristic of posttraumatic stress disorder” (PTSD).
113
  
The research shows that evidence of such symptoms suggests an increased 
possibility of “catastrophic decline in memory performance.”
114
  Thus, 
 
106 Guerra v. Collins, 916 F. Supp. 620, 624 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Guerra v. 
Johnson, 90 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1996). 
107 Id. at 627.  DNA exonerations also show that the use of leading questions can lead 
young victims to identify a suspect wrongly.  See GARRETT, supra note 99 (Leonard 
McSherry case: seven-year-old victim’s actual description of culprit was ignored, and police 
used leading questions to “help her go along with what [they] were trying to emphasize”). 
108 See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
109 See supra notes 74–75. 
110 See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, supra note 10, at 1502–03 (reporting that “very 
young children and the elderly perform [] significantly worse than younger adults” in studies 
of eyewitness identification (quoting Wells & Olson, supra note 83, at 280)). 
111 It is obvious that a person’s physical and mental condition is affected by intoxicants 
and some medications such as painkillers.  Courts nonetheless have allowed witnesses who 
observed assailants under these conditions to give eyewitness testimony.  See Sandra Guerra 
Thompson, Judicial Blindness to Eyewitness Misidentification, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 639, 653 
(2009) [hereinafter Judicial Blindness]. 
112 Scientists refer to such factors as “estimator variables” because these variables relate 
solely to the innate qualities of a witness’s observation and cannot be improved through 
systemic change.  See Wells & Seelau, supra note 64, at 765–66. 
113 See Deffenbacher et al., supra note 83, at 822. 
114 Id. 
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research indicates that the trauma of a violent crime may cause witnesses to 
develop psychological problems such as PTSD, a symptom of which is loss 
of memory.  Psychological disorders such as PTSD might also make a 
witness more vulnerable to suggestive or coercive practices; this would be a 
useful area of research for social scientists to pursue.
115
 
In short, all three types of testimonial evidence studied here derive 
from interactions of the police with individuals who may have information 
to offer.  In each instance, the individuals tend to be at a significant 
psychological disadvantage due to the circumstances in which they find 
themselves and possibly also due to certain other factors that make them 
less reliable sources of information.  The police believe they know the 
identity of the criminal, so their goal during the questioning of these 
individuals is to obtain confirmation, not neutral truth-seeking.  To facilitate 
the information gathering, the police may use methods that are highly 
suggestive, coercive, or deceptive.  These tactics have been shown to create 
a substantial risk of producing false information, leading to wrongful 
convictions. 
Moreover, the processes involved in gathering police-generated 
witness testimony have traditionally remained beyond public scrutiny.  
Researchers have outlined a number of advantages that accrue to law 
enforcement by maintaining the secrecy of individual custodial 
interrogations and negotiations with informants.
116
  The incentives for law 
enforcement run squarely against thorough documentation requirements: 
documentation invites criticism, judicial oversight, and possible legal 
repercussions for intentional or unintentional legal violations.  Interference 
in the processes that produce admissible prosecution evidence may be seen 





115 Garrett’s research shows that victims often report feeling nervous or scared during 
identification procedures, sometimes hastily selecting someone in order to get out of the 
room quickly.  GARRETT, supra note 99 (Ulysses Rodriguez Charles case: victim picked a 
filler and then was told to keep looking, so she picked another photo and ran out of the room; 
Luis Diaz case: victim initially identified another man in the lineup because she “wanted to 
get out of the room”; Jeffrey Todd Pierce case: victim was unable to identify Pierce at a 
show-up following the offense because she reported being “hysterical and . . . still in a state 
of shock”; Brian Piszczek case: victim reported that six weeks after the crime, she was “still 
hysterical” but claimed that her memory had improved over time). 
116 NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 83–99; see LEO, supra note 10, at 83–84 (discussing the 
perceived need for secrecy in the context of behavioral lie-detection methods).  
117 See JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 224–29 (1996) (describing the protective 
culture within police departments which leads to constant attempts to circumvent mandates 
imposed from outside the organization); Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the 
Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 848 (1999) 
(“[E]xternal controls and accountability mechanisms (desirable as they are) cannot be 
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Custodial interrogations in most jurisdictions are not routinely 
recorded, so the process cannot be fully evaluated to determine whether the 
officers may have contaminated the process by suggesting details of the 
crime to the suspect or whether there were coercive means used to obtain 
the statements.
118
  Thus, besides the DNA exoneration cases that involve 
false confessions, it is impossible to know how many more false 
confessions may have led to wrongful convictions.
119
  The unavailability of 
DNA in those cases means that the injustice may never be discovered. 
Eyewitness identification procedures typically generate insufficient 
documentation.  It may be common to preserve a photograph of a lineup or 
the photo array used in a case, but interviews with eyewitnesses have 
generally not been well documented and certainly have not been 
electronically recorded.  Some jurisdictions have made great strides in this 
area, but most have not.
120
 
With police informants, even prosecutors may not know much about 
the informant’s history as a prosecution witness in a past case or the 
rewards given for the informant’s previous testimony.  Police officers are 
normally reluctant to share information about their informants with 
prosecutors because they may not trust prosecutors to manage their 
informants properly.
121
  Natapoff reports that New York and Chicago police 
went so far as to maintain “double file” systems for investigative reports: 
one set was shared with the public and prosecutors, and one set was kept 
secret.
122
  For constitutional purposes, prosecutors are required to make 
pretrial disclosures about the witness’s history as an informant that tends to 
impeach the credibility of the witness, such as the informant’s criminal 
record, prior testimony as an informant, rewards promised, etc.
123
  
However, there is no corresponding affirmative duty for prosecutors to 
obtain the information from the police, nor do they have the incentives to 
seek out such impeachment material on their witnesses.
124
  Thus, for all 
intents and purposes, all three types of evidence—confessions, informant 
statements, and eyewitness identifications—have been understood only 
 
expected to be effective unless police organizations are themselves involved in the process 
of control.” (quoting DAVID DIXON, LAW IN POLICING: LEGAL REGULATION AND POLICE 
PRACTICES 94–95 (1997))). 
118 Garrett, supra note 73, at 1110. 
119 Id. 
120 See What Price Justice?, supra note 59, at 42–43. 
121 See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 23. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 58–60. 
124 Id. at 74–75 (discussing Los Angeles scandal that revealed that prosecutors 
intentionally did not track informants’ histories and rewards). 
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through the oral testimony of participants in the questioning: the police 
officers (relating confessions), informants, and eyewitnesses. 
B. BEST PRACTICES 
As the number of DNA exonerations reaches 300,
125
 the calls for 
reform to address the causes of wrongful convictions continue to ring out 
from various quarters.  Legal reform groups such as the Innocence Project 
and the (now-defunct) Justice Project have published reports outlining best 
practices,
126
 as have the American Bar Association
127
 and social science 
scholars.
128
  Among the law scholars who specialize in wrongful 
convictions,
129
 most focus on a particular cause of wrongful convictions 
 
125 As of this writing, the Innocence Project of the Cardozo School of Law reports that 
DNA evidence has led to the exoneration of 300 individuals.  Know the Cases, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited October 10, 2012). 
126 Understand the Causes: The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2012); THE JUSTICE 
PROJECT, THE SOLUTION: AGENDA FOR REFORM (on file with author).  On eyewitness 
identification, see Model Legislation, 2009 State Legislative Sessions: An Act to Improve the 
Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Oct. 2008), 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/09_model_legislation/Eyewitness_ID_
Prescriptive_Model_Bill_2009.pdf; THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A 
POLICY REVIEW (2007), available at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/~glwells/
The_Justice%20Project_Eyewitness_Identification_%20A_Policy_Review.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2012).  On custodial interrogations, see Model Legislation, 2010 Legislative 
Sessions: An Act Directing the Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT (Dec. 2009),  http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/2010/Recording_of_Custodial
_Interrogations_Model_Bill_2010.pdf; THE JUSTICE PROJECT, ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF 
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS: A POLICY REVIEW (2007) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC 
RECORDING] (on file with author).  On police informants, see THE JUSTICE PROJECT, IN-
CUSTODY INFORMANT TESTIMONY: A POLICY REVIEW (2007) [hereinafter INFORMANT 
REPORT] (on file with author). 
127 See AM. BAR ASS’N (ABA), ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING 
THE GUILTY: REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION’S AD HOC INNOCENCE 
COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS (Paul C. Giannelli & 
Myrna S. Raeder eds., 2006), reprinted in 37 SW. U. L. REV. 763 (2008) [hereinafter ABA 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION] (addressing all the types of evidence examined here, among 
others). 
128 See supra notes 10 & 45 and infra notes 158 & 163. 
129 The literature on wrongful convictions issues other than confessions, the use of police 
informants, and eyewitness identifications covers a wide area of other causes and concerns.  
A few examples include: Garrett, supra note 30 (providing an empirical study of case law of 
exonerees, and finding that appellate review is ineffective in reviewing inaccurate evidence); 
Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1123 (2005) (addressing impediments to gathering and introducing evidence); 
Richard A. Leo & John B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions: Learning from Social 
Science, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7 (2009) (arguing that legal scholars should use social 
science to address wrongful convictions, not simply narrative or doctrine). 
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 or police 
informants.
132




130 This author and a few others addressed the admissibility of identification testimony 
relating solely to reliability and urged procedural reforms.  See, e.g., Noah Clements, 
Flipping a Coin: A Solution for the Inherent Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification 
Testimony, 40 IND. L. REV. 271 (2007) (proposing blanket exclusion of eyewitness 
identification testimony in criminal cases due to unreliability); Margery Malkin Koosed, The 
Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won’t—Unless It Also Curbs Mistaken Eyewitness 
Identifications, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 263 (2002) (calling for legislative measures to assure greater 
reliability of eyewitness identification testimony in capital cases); Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt?, supra note 10 (recommending a corroboration requirement for admission of 
eyewitness identification evidence); Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 631–33 
(urging state courts to apply state constitutional law or evidentiary rules to guard against 
admission of unreliable identification testimony); What Price Justice?, supra note 59 
(reviewing reform proposals for eyewitness identification procedures); Richard A. Wise, 
Kirsten A. Dauphinais & Martin A. Safer, A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807 (2007) (advocating expanded use of expert testimony, 
improved procedural safeguards, and judicial education). 
131 Richard Leo, together with various co-authors, has done extensive empirical legal 
work on custodial interrogations and the reforms needed to improve reliability.  See Mark 
Costanzo & Richard A. Leo, Research and Expert Testimony on Interrogation and 
Confessions, in EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY FOR THE COURTS 69 (Mark Costanzo, 
Daniel Krauss & Kathy Pezdek eds., 2006); Deborah Davis & Richard Leo, Strategies for 
Preventing False Confessions and Their Consequences, in PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR 
FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 121 (Mark R. Kebbell & Graham M. Davies 
eds., 2006); Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal 
Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479 [hereinafter Bringing 
Reliability Back In]; LEO, supra note 10, at 288–317;  see also Garrett, supra note 73; 
Eugene R. Milhizer, Confessions After Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution for Excluding 
Unreliable Confessions, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2008).  Most other scholars writing in the area 
of custodial interrogations have focused exclusively on the constitutional issues such as the 
applicability of Miranda, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and voluntariness under the 
Due Process Clause.  For a small sample of the rich constitutional literature, see Morgan 
Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded 
Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495 (2002) (addressing constitutional doctrine pertaining to 
interrogations of the mentally retarded); Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False 
Confessions Discovered, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 623 (2007) (critiquing Supreme Court’s 
subversion of reliability factor in recent constitutional confession law); George C. Thomas 
III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
1091, 1103 (2003) (reviewing WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS (2001)). 
132 Alexandra Natapoff has written extensively on the subject.  See NATAPOFF, supra note 
2; Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful 
Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107 (2006).  Other scholars have made important 
contributions to the issue as well.  See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and 
Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2000); Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: 
Wrongful Convictions and the Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering Testimony by Jailhouse 
Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1413 (2007); Ellen Yaroshefsky, 
Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishments, 
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (1999). 
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and most legislatures have taken some type of action, whether to form a 
study group or to enact new legislation.
134
  Some state and federal courts 
have also recognized the danger of wrongful conviction posed by the types 
of evidence studied here, but only a few have created rules to minimize the 
risk.
135
  For example, more than ten years after the Department of Justice 
issued a comprehensive set of guidelines for reforms of police procedures 
for eyewitness identification, only a few jurisdictions have mandated any of 
those procedures.
136
  Moreover, even jurisdictions that have enacted new 
procedures for identification evidence have not gone so far as to mandate 
exclusion of the evidence for failure to follow the procedures.
137
  Thus, we 
have seen some significant improvement in the quality of identification 
evidence in a few states and localities, but little to no improvement in most 
jurisdictions.
138
  Reforms of both custodial interrogation and the use of 
police informants have lagged even more than reform of eyewitness 
 
133 The most comprehensive and influential reports by law enforcement pertain to 
eyewitness identifications.  They include: NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf; N.C. ACTUAL INNOCENCE COMM’N, 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2003), available at 
http://www.ncids.org/New Legal Resources/Eyewitness ID.pdf; OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 
STATE OF N.J., ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO 
AND LIVE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (2001), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf.  For a discussion of reform proposals on 
eyewitness identifications, see What Price Justice?, supra note 59, at 40–55. 
134 See Reforms by State, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
news/LawView3.php (providing  links to state legislation on eyewitness identification 
reforms); Reforms by State: State Laws Requiring Recorded Interrogations, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/LawView3.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2012) 
(providing links to state legislation on electronic recording of interrogations); INFORMANT 
REPORT, supra note 126, at 4–5, 14 (addressing legislative actions regarding the use of 
informant testimony). 
135 See INFORMANT REPORT, supra note 126, at 6–7 (outlining the federal and state case 
law recognizing safeguards in the use of informant testimony). 
136 See, e.g., Reforms by State, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
news/LawView5.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2012) (showing only eleven states with state-wide 
eyewitness identification reforms). 
137 Thus, courts can and do continue to admit identification evidence, even though it is 
shown to be produced by means known to decrease the reliability of the evidence and despite 
the fact that there are known means for reducing the degree of unreliability that law 
enforcement officials have simply chosen not to adopt.  See Judicial Blindness, supra note 
111, at 657–58. 
138 I have previously cataloged the few jurisprudential innovations of state courts, see 
Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 621–30, as well as the few states that have 
adopted reform procedures as a matter of law or by voluntary adoption, see What Price 
Justice?, supra note 59, at 42–55. 
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identification.
139
  Overall, it is fair to say that actual reform of police 
practices in these three areas has proved sporadic, and there is much room 
for improvement in the practices actually used to collect these three types of 
evidence. 
Interestingly, the procedures recommended for all three types of 
evidence have certain elements in common.  On further reflection, the 
similarities in the best practices proposed by reformers (and observed in 
some jurisdictions) should not surprise us.  Since so many of the 
weaknesses of all three types of evidence derive from the interactions of 
vulnerable individuals and determined investigators, as shown above, it 
stands to reason that the practices most likely to improve reliability would 
share similar traits. 
First, for all three types of police-generated witness testimony 
considered here, best practices include procedures that protect against 
“contamination” by providing details of the crime to the individual being 
questioned or using suggestive tactics.
140
  Especially for lineups and photo 
arrays, and to a lesser extent for interrogations, it is considered good 
practice to use a “blind” questioner (an officer who does not have 
information about the crime or the suspect).
141
  For eyewitness 
identifications, it is recommended practice that the person administering the 
identification procedure also gives cautionary instructions to the witness so 
that the witness does not try to discern clues from the investigator and so 
that the witness does not feel any pressure to make a selection.  Blind 
administration of identification procedures also eliminates the problem that 
occurs when officers give confirmatory feedback to the witness (such as, 
 
139 For interrogations, the primary reform measure has been electronic recording, but in 
only a few jurisdictions have we seen any meaningful efforts to curb the coercive or 
suggestive practices used by law enforcement through legislative or judicial means.  See 
infra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.  In the area of police informants, Natapoff 
reports that jurisdictions have enacted only a few legislative safeguards.  See NATAPOFF, 
supra note 2, at 192–200. 
140 Leo invokes the concept of contamination in discussing the ways in which 
interrogators may feed nonpublic details of crimes to suspects in helping the suspects to 
construct the public narrative that will explain how and why the crime was committed.  See 
LEO, supra note 10, at 234–35, 286–87. 
141 Using a “blind” administrator for a study is a device commonly used to maintain the 
integrity of social science research studies.  See Amy Klobuchar, Nancy K. Mehrkens 
Steblay & Hilary Lindell Caligiuri, Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin 
County’s Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 381, 
389–90 (2006).  It is a feature of the leading reform proposals for eyewitness identifications.  
See What Price Justice?, supra note 59, at 43–44. 
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“You picked the right person”), which has the effect of increasing a 
witness’s level of confidence in the selection made.
142
 
For custodial interrogation, the Supreme Court already mandates 
cautionary instructions to the arrestee prior to the questioning.
143
  The 
Miranda warnings ostensibly serve the purpose of putting the arrestee on 
stronger footing vis-à-vis the questioner so as to reduce the possibility of 
coercion, thus protecting a vulnerable individual from possible coercion by 
a determined interrogator.  Moreover, to avoid contamination of the 
process, Leo and Ofshe would have courts review confessions for evidence 
that the information actually originates from the suspect and is not the 
product of contamination by the police.
 144
  According to a study of thirty-
eight exonerations by Garrett, “[i]n all cases but two (ninety-seven 
percent—or thirty-six of the thirty-eight—of the exonerees for whom trial 
or pretrial records could be obtained), police reported that suspects 
confessed to a series of specific details concerning how the crime 
occurred.”
145
  This leads him to conclude that “police likely disclosed those 
details during interrogations by telling [the suspects] how the crime 
happened.”
146
  As a guard against such contamination, Garrett proposes the 
use of an investigator who is not involved in the investigation and is not 
 
142 See Wells & Bradfield, supra note 85, at 364 (finding feedback given to witnesses 
after identifying suspect produces strong effects on witnesses’ retrospective reports of their 
certainty, quality of the view they had, clarity of their memory, speed with which they 
identified the suspect, and several other measures). 
143 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
144 LEO, supra note 10, at 286–87.  Rather than considering the circumstances under 
which a confession is obtained, the courts instead compare the facts of the crime known only 
to the police to the statements made by the individual, looking for the “degree of fit.”  Id. at 
286.  This approach calls on the judge to assess three factors that indicate the individual’s 
personal knowledge: whether the confession provided information that “leads to the 
discovery of evidence unknown to the police,” (2) whether it provided information about 
“highly unusual elements of the crime that have not been made public,” and (3) whether it 
provided “an accurate description of the mundane details of the crime scene which are not 
easily guessed and have not been reported publicly.”  Id. (quoting State v. Mauchley, 467 
P.3d 477, 489 (Utah 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The purpose of considering 
the mundane details of the crime scene, for example, is that those are “less likely to be the 
result of suggestion by the police.”  Id.  Videotaping is especially important because at least 
one study by Brandon Garrett shows that false confessions frequently contain “surprisingly 
rich, detailed, and accurate information” about the crime, precisely the kind of information 
that is considered evidence of the reliability of the confession.  See Garrett, supra note 73, at 
1054. 
145 Garrett, supra note 73, at 1054. 
146 Id. 
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privy to the details of the crime.
 147




Second, proper documentation, preferably through videotaping, is 
recommended for all three types of evidence.  The lack of information 
about each of these three types of investigative activities has posed a 
challenge to courts and reformers who seek to impose some form of 
regulation.
149
  Indeed, secrecy shrouds the practice of custodial 
interrogation and the use of police informants,
150
 and identification 





147 Id. at 1116. 
148 Id.  This proposal would encounter resistance from police officers who likely consider 
it essential for an interrogator to know what information to seek and what inconsistencies to 
confront a suspect with.  I do not here propose the use of blind interrogators, but since it 
would clearly eliminate the problem of contamination it is worthy of further exploration. 
149 For courts and researchers studying custodial interrogations, police training manuals 
have provided a wealth of information about the psychological tactics used to obtain 
incriminating statements from suspects.  See LEO, supra note 10, at 106–16 (addressing 
techniques of psychological manipulation explained in police training manuals).  More 
recently, researchers have conducted field studies that provide some information about 
confessions and eyewitness identifications.  See, e.g., Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. 
Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 475 (2001) (on studies of actual identification practices); Richard J. Ofshe & 
Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and 
Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 189–251 (1997) (on 
interrogations).  To gather information about police informants, Natapoff conducted 
interviews of informants and detectives; researched statutes, case law and news reports; and 
studied other writings on the subject, including reform proposals.  See generally NATAPOFF, 
supra note 2. 
150 See LEO, supra note 10, at 35–36 (discussing the secretiveness of interrogations); 
NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 83–99 (discussing the secretiveness of informant practices). 
151 One may view the Supreme Court’s recognition of a right to counsel at lineups as an 
attempt to provide a prophylactic remedy for possible police suggestion.  See United States 
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–38 (1967); see also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 
(1967).  The presence of counsel can better ensure that non-suggestive practices are 
followed.  However, the presence of counsel serves as a poor substitute for proper 
documentation because it puts counsel in the position of becoming a witness and being 
disqualified to continue as counsel.  See, e.g., United States v. Peng, 602 F. Supp. 298, 300–
03 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (disqualifying defense counsel as attorney under Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility DR 5-102(a) because counsel participated in a conference 
between defendant and a witness, thus becoming witness himself).  Of course, the Court’s 
later opinions so greatly limited the scope of the right to counsel as to virtually nullify it.  
See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, supra note 10, at 1510–11 (addressing the effects of 
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972), and United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 
(1973), which apply right to counsel only to post-indictment lineups and live lineups, 
respectively).  Thus, the right to counsel has not served effectively either as a prophylactic 
remedy or as a substitute for a documentation requirement. 
360 SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON [Vol. 102 
The leading reform on interrogations is the videotaping of the entirety 
of the interrogation, which is considered “imperative . . . so that it is 
possible to discern whether the facts were suggested to the [suspects] prior 
to the subsequent recording of a confession.”
152
  Videotaping of the entirety 
of the interrogation allows the court to evaluate whether any improper 
suggestion occurred and thus avoid resorting to the inevitable “swearing 
match” between the police and the defendant.
153
  Although a number of 
states have adopted videotaping and the trend is strengthening, a majority of 
law enforcement agencies still do not videotape interrogations.
154
 
Reformers propose adequate documentation and disclosure of evidence 
relating to eyewitness identifications and informant testimony as well.
155
  At 
a minimum, for eyewitness identifications, the police should preserve the 
photo arrays used or create a photographic image of the live lineup so that 
they become part of the record.
156
  Ideally, the interaction between an 
eyewitness and a police investigator during the administration of an 
identification procedure would be documented by means of videotaping, in 
addition to preserving the lineup or photo array.
157
  With regard to 
informant testimony, the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern 
 
152 Garrett, supra note 73, at 1059; see generally LEO, supra note 10, at 291–305 
(regarding the movement for electronic recording of interrogations).  The ABA Criminal 
Justice Section urges law enforcement agencies to videotape the entirety of custodial 
interrogations, and further urges courts or legislatures, or both, to enact rules of procedure 
requiring such videotaping.  See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 127, at 11–22.  
The Justice Project made the same recommendation for felony cases.  See ELECTRONIC 
RECORDING, supra note 126, at 2–4. 
153 Additionally, videotaping would actually “save substantial court time and expense 
because electronically recorded confessions would induce guilty pleas from individuals who 
would otherwise take their cases to trial.”  Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In, supra 
note 131, 524 n.301.  It would also “cut down on the time spent testifying by police and 
defendants at pretrial hearings (such as voluntariness hearings) about what occurred during 
the interrogation because the electronic recording objectively resolves that issue.”  Id. 
154 See ELECTRONIC RECORDING, supra note 126, at 2 (“In 2004–2005, state legislators in 
twenty-five states introduced legislation seeking to mandate the recording of custodial 
interrogations.”); LEO, supra note 10, at 296 (noting that most police departments do not 
record interrogations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation refuses to record as a matter of 
policy). 
155 See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 192–94 (discovery and disclosure of information 
about informants); What Price Justice?, supra note 59, at 48–49 (documentation of 
identification procedures). 
156 See What Price Justice?, supra note 59, at 48 & nn.137–38 (stating that New Jersey 
and North Carolina require photographic or video documentation, while the Innocence 
Project proposes only photographic documentation). 
157 See id. at 48–49 (stating that the Department of Justice encourages, but does not 
require, audio or video recording, and the ABA Criminal Justice Section requires video 
recording “whenever practicable” or photographic documentation if video recording is not 
possible). 
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University School of Law recommends that informants be wired to 
electronically record any incriminating statements made by suspects.
158
  
The group also recommends that law enforcement authorities electronically 
record their discussions with potential informants.
159
  The photographs of 
lineups and electronic recordings of the administration of identification 
procedures, as well as those recordings and other information pertaining to 
informants, should all be disclosed to the defense before trial.
160
 
In addition, for eyewitness identifications, the best practices call for 
soliciting and documenting an eyewitness’s confidence level after a positive 
identification so as to document the degree of confidence at that time.
161
  
This has been found to be important because the witness will typically 
receive confirmatory feedback from the investigating officer or the 
prosecutor who will meet with the witness during the pretrial stage of the 
proceedings.
162
  Indeed, the very process of pretrial preparation has been 
found to increase a witness’s confidence in the identification such that the 
confidence exhibited at trial exceeds that which the witness reports 
initially.
163
  A confidence statement made at the time of the identification is 
critical to properly evaluate the likely accuracy of an identification. 
Third, there is a growing recognition of the importance of jury 
instructions and expert witnesses to help jurors better appreciate the ways in 
which these types of evidence may be rendered less reliable.
164
  These 
remedies assume the traditional treatment of these three types of evidence, 
which is that the court will not conduct pretrial reliability screening and that 
 
158 CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 15. 
159 Id. 
160 See id. (proposing disclosure requirements relating to informant testimony); 
INFORMANT REPORT, supra note 126, at 3 (recommending mandatory, automatic pretrial 
disclosures relating to in-custody informants); NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 192–94 (making 
the same recommendations as the Justice Project but for all police informants, not limited to 
in-custody informants). 
161 See What Price Justice?, supra note 59, at 52; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2933.83(A)(6)(h)–(i) (West 2011) (requiring the administrator of a photo or live lineup to 
obtain a statement of the witness’s confidence, stated in the eyewitness’s own words, as to 
the certainty of the eyewitness’s identification and prohibiting any confirmatory feedback to 
the witness until the administrator has documented the results of the procedure). 
162 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
163 See Shaw & McClure, supra note 85, at 630–31, 649–50 (stating that the adjudicative 
process and witness preparation for trial can artificially increase a witness’s stated 
confidence level). 
164 The ABA Criminal Justice Section’s proposals address all three types of evidence.  
The report addresses the discretion exercised by courts to allow testimony by experts on 
eyewitness identification and to give cautionary jury instructions on identifications and 
jailhouse informants.  See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 127, at 24 
(admission of expert testimony and use of jury instructions on eyewitness identification); id. 
at 77 (practices regarding jury instructions on jailhouse informants). 
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the jury alone will weigh its reliability.  For example, the Justice Project 
recommended the use of jury instructions warning jurors about the special 
unreliability of jailhouse informants.
165
 
The use of jury instructions and expert witnesses has grown 
substantially in the area of eyewitness identification, reversing the 
traditional rejection of these devices.
166
  With regard to the social science of 
interrogations, Leo reports that the use of expert testimony has also become 
increasingly common.
167
  He also notes that the use of jury instructions 
regarding interrogations remains “rare,” but such a reform offers several 
important advantages.
168
  No court has ever admitted expert testimony by a 
defendant on the unreliability of police informants, “although comparable 
government witnesses (e.g., police handlers, gang experts, etc.) have been 
permitted to testify about how informants operate.”
169
 
In any case, studies have shown that jurors are psychologically 
predisposed to believe eyewitness identification testimony and evidence of 
confessions,
170
 so these remedies would have to overcome that 
psychological predisposition.  Nor does the use of jury instructions hold 
much hope as an effective remedy in cases involving police informants.  
Natapoff argues that social science casts doubt on the ability of jurors to 
understand and properly apply jury instructions.
171
  Another study also 
indicates that jurors are no less likely to believe a witness, even if they learn 
that the witness has received a reward or incentive for the testimony.
172
 
Finally, there are calls to require corroborating evidence in 
determining the admissibility of these three types of evidence.  Police 
informant testimony (including that given by alleged accomplices) presents 
such a risk of unreliability that some states have already adopted a 
requirement that it be corroborated by other evidence.
173
  In addition, 
 
165 INFORMANT REPORT, supra note 126, at 2. 
166 See Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 628–30. 
167 See LEO, supra note 10, at 314–16. 
168 Id. at 316–17. 
169 Correspondence from Alexandra Natapoff, Aug. 2, 2011 (on file with author). 
170 See CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 83, at 207–09 (summarizing survey studies, 
prediction studies, and mock juror studies, and concluding that “jurors are generally 
insensitive to factors that influence eyewitness identification accuracy”); LEO, supra note 10, 
at 265 (explaining that jurors are subject to tunnel vision and confirmation bias, especially 
after learning that the defendant has written or signed a confession statement). 
171 See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 197–99 (taking issue with the Justice Project proposal 
based on psychological studies of juror behavior). 
172 Id. at 77. 
173 See id. at 196–97 (discussing reforms in Texas and at the federal level); see also TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.075 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (requiring that the testimony 
of a person confined in same correctional facility as the defendant be corroborated by 
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groups like the ABA and the Justice Project have urged this restriction on 
the use of informant testimony.
174
 
I have previously called for a corroboration requirement for eyewitness 
identification testimony as a means of better ensuring reliability.
175
  To date, 
only a 2009 Maryland law requires evidence corroborating the testimony of 
eyewitnesses, and the restriction applies solely in capital cases.
176
  In every 
other American jurisdiction, a single eyewitness’s testimony identifying a 
stranger as the guilty perpetrator can convict a person of a serious crime, 
including capital murder. 
Leo puts forth what amounts to a new corroboration requirement for 
confessions.  He has proposed a “new reliability test,” which involves 
determining the “fit” between the details provided by the suspect and the 
known crime facts and other objective evidence.
177
  He would require courts 
to weigh three factors similar to those in the previous trustworthiness test he 
outlined with Ofshe.  Under his new test, courts should weigh:  
(1) whether the confession contains nonpublic information that can be independently 
verified, would be known only by the true perpetrator or an accomplice, and cannot 
likely be guessed by chance; (2) whether the confession led the police to new 
evidence about the crime; and (3) whether the suspect’s postadmission narrative fits 
the crime facts and other objective evidence.
178
  
Although no jurisdiction has yet adopted a corroboration requirement for 
confessions evidence, a number of courts have applied a “trustworthiness” 
test, similar to one previously proposed by Ofshe and Leo, which also took 
 
evidence connecting the defendant with the offense); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111.5 (West 
Supp. 2011) (same; also disallowing corroboration to come from another in-custody 
informant). 
174 See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 197. 
175 See Judicial Blindness, supra note 111, at 1523–43. 
176 See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. L. § 2-202(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).  See also Margery 
Malkin Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and Practices to Protect the 
Innocent, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 633–39 (2009) (addressing the Maryland identification 
law, as well as efforts to adopt similar corroboration requirements in Illinois, Massachusetts, 
and Britain). 
177 LEO, supra note 10, at 288–89.  Leo notes that courts have long applied a 
corroboration rule (the corpus delicti rule) to out-of-court confessions.  Id. at 284–85.  He 
explains that the corpus delicti rule is not a useful tool for assuring reliability, however, 
because it requires corroborating evidence of the crime itself—not evidence to corroborate 
the confession.  Id. at 284.  The rule addresses a valid concern that in some cases individuals 
will confess falsely to murders that did not occur; thus, it requires corroborating evidence 
that a harm or injury actually befell the victim.  The rule focuses only on proof of the crime, 
not the reliability of the confession, so we cannot assume that proof of the former also 
proves the latter.  As Leo writes, “this has been disproved by countless false confessions to 
very real crimes.”  Id. 
178 Id. at 289. 
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into account the existence of corroborating evidence.
179
  Thus, there is 
reason to think that some courts might continue to examine corroborating 
evidence in determining the admissibility of confessions. 
Ideally, police departments across the country would adopt all the best 
practices in procuring confessions, informant testimony, and eyewitness 
identifications.
180
  Although the use of proper police procedures cannot 
eliminate the risk that a police-generated statement is still false, the 
adoption of best practices would reduce the element of unreliability 
introduced by suggestive or coercive police practices.  Proper 
documentation and discovery would allow the courts to conduct a more 
accurate reliability assessment. 
III. PRETRIAL RELIABILITY HEARINGS IN CRIMINAL CASES 
In addition to best practices for the police, researchers have 
recommended that courts conduct pretrial reliability hearings for police-
generated testimonial evidence.
181
  The recommendations for pretrial 
reliability screening call into question the traditional practices of trial courts 
in admitting possibly unreliable prosecution evidence and would require a 
new approach to admitting these three common forms of evidence.  For 
confessions and eyewitness identifications, courts have routinely exercised 
a limited gatekeeping role confined to reviewing the prosecution’s evidence 
for possible constitutional violations.
182
  Remarkably, informant testimony 





179 Id. at 285–86. 
180 For information about the jurisdictions that have adopted best practices in eyewitness 
identifications, confessions, and the use of informants, see supra notes 126 & 136. 
181 See infra notes 236–40 and accompanying text. 
182 Confessions must comply with the due process “voluntariness” test, the rule in 
Miranda v. Arizona, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  See LEO, supra note 10, at 
272–83.  Identification testimony must meet the due process requirements set forth in 
Manson v. Brathwaite and the extremely limited right to counsel.  See Judicial Blindness, 
supra note 111, at 1509–14 (addressing right to counsel and due process rights for 
eyewitness identifications). 
183 See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 58–60 (explaining that the central protection against 
use of informant testimony is the requirement that the government turn over certain 
information about the informant to the defense; only Illinois requires a reliability hearing for 
informants in capital cases and Texas requires corroboration).  With the recent repeal of the 
death penalty in Illinois, this protection for capital cases is no longer needed.  See supra note 
8.  California now also requires corroboration of informant testimony.  See CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1111.5 (West Supp. 2011).  Of course, cross-examination on the basis of the 
disclosed information serves to test the reliability of the informant.  However, due to the 
limits of the disclosure requirements as well as numerous documented cases of prosecutorial 
misconduct in failing to disclose such information, defense counsel may not have the ability 
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The following sections reveal the inadequacies of current due process 
screening as a means of ensuring the reliability of police-generated witness 
testimony.  They also show that courts have engaged in reliability 
gatekeeping under the rules of evidence for various types of lay witness 
testimony, most often to exclude defense witnesses. 
A. DUE PROCESS FAILS TO ENSURE RELIABILITY 
Due process under federal law has only limited effectiveness in 
regulating police-generated witness testimony.  With regard to informant 
testimony, due process fundamental fairness may call for exclusion, but 
only in cases where the defense can show “outrageous government 
conduct” in using the informant to manufacture the evidence and set up a 
person who was not otherwise involved in criminal activity.
184
  The more 
typical jailhouse informant provides information about a person who has 
already been arrested, so this application of due process would not apply.  
For jailhouse informant testimony, the central constitutional protections 
require limited disclosure and discovery of “impeachment material” 
regarding the informant.
185
  Due process has not been applied to require a 
reliability assessment by the courts. 
For confessions and identifications, due process protects against 
inappropriate police procedures in gathering the evidence, which may affect 
reliability.  However, unreliability without more does not mandate 
exclusion under federal due process law.  The Supreme Court has made it 
clear that no matter how unreliable a confession may be, unless it is a 
product of overreaching state action, no due process violation occurs.
186
  
Moreover, the defense must show that the overreaching by the police 
caused the defendant to confess.
187
  In Colorado v. Connelly, the defendant, 
who suffered from schizophrenia, confessed and provided critical details 
about a previously unsolved murder.
188
  There was no suggestion that the 
 
to conduct an effective cross-examination.  See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 58–60 (noting 
limited nature of discovery requirements); see also Raeder, supra note 132, at 1439–47 
(arguing that current constitutional jurisprudence does not promote sufficiently high 
standards of ethical behavior relating to the disclosure of informant information). 
184 See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 61. 
185 See id. at 58. 
186 Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of 
Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 609–11 (2006) (discussing 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986)). 
187 Id. at 610–11; see also Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False Confessions 
Discovered, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 623, 624–28 (2007) (tracing the historical treatment of 
reliability in confessions law to the present day, in which it is no longer an independently 
relevant factor). 
188 Marcus, supra note 186, at 610–11. 
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police had in any way coerced Connelly to confess.  The Court thus found 
no due process violation. 
Viewed purely as a matter of evidentiary reliability, Connelly’s 
confession may well have been reliable.  If he provided the police with 
important information about a murder that would only have been known to 
the killer—and which was not even known to the police at the time—then it 
is likely his confession was true.  The point here is that under the due 
process analysis, courts are not required to make a reliability determination 
as a condition of admissibility.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that 




What makes matters worse is that even when there is evidence of 
police lies, threats, and other coercive conduct, the due process 
voluntariness test fails to ensure the reliability of the suspect’s statements.  
After reviewing thousands of cases from the 1990s and 2000s challenging 
the voluntariness of confessions, Paul Marcus concludes: 
One necessarily comes away with a feeling of being unclean and tainted by 
government activities that are not honorable even given the environment needed for 
interrogations.  Many judges allow confessions into evidence in cases in which police 
interrogators lied and threatened defendants or played on the mental, emotional, or 
physical weaknesses of suspects.  While judges write that they do not condone such 
conduct and find such practices repugnant, reprehensible, or deplorable, some of those 
same judges have upheld the admission of such confessions that result from those 
practices after applying the totality of circumstances test.
190
 
It bears noting as well that the due process voluntariness test does not take 
into account whether critical best practices have been followed, such as 
videotaping, lack of contamination by suggesting facts of the crime, and 
independent corroborating evidence. 
In judging eyewitness identifications, the Supreme Court considers 
reliability the “linchpin” of its due process analysis.
191
  Yet scholars have 
consistently bemoaned the many failures of the test as a reliability-
screening tool.
192
  First, as with confessions, due process only protects 
against inappropriate evidence-gathering procedures.  But unreliability due 
 
189 See Garrett, supra note 73, at 1091–92 (“The Court summarized the turn in its 
jurisprudence, stating that though a confession statement ‘might be proved to be quite 
unreliable . . . this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum, . . . not by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 167 (1986))). 
190 Marcus, supra note 186, at 643 (footnotes omitted). 
191 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). 
192 See, e.g., Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 607 n. 21 (listing citations). 
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solely to other causes is not a sufficient ground for exclusion.
193
  The 
fundamental unfairness of being convicted largely or even solely on 
patently unreliable identification evidence has no federal due process 
traction, unless the police also acted in an unduly suggestive way.
194
 
Second, even if the police do use unduly suggestive procedures, due 
process does not require exclusion if the identification is nonetheless 
reliable.  Reliability, as the Court defines it, does not take police 
suggestiveness into account.
195
  The Court’s reliability checklist ignores the 
several ways in which police suggestiveness can produce and reinforce a 
false identification.  Instead, it provides what has come to be an exclusive 
list of five factors that bear on reliability.  Four of the factors take into 
account characteristics of the witness and the circumstances surrounding the 
viewing, which are appropriate considerations in a reliability assessment.
196
  
However, one of the factors listed by the Court (which federal courts are 
still required to consider) has been scientifically shown not to have a 
bearing on reliability—“the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness 
at the confrontation.”
197
  One might take the view that this reliability test is 
mostly appropriate and good enough, until one considers all the other 
relevant factors that are missing.  The most crucial omissions are whether 
the identification was cross-racial and whether the witness was intrinsically 
less reliable due to age, mental ability, or intoxication.
198
  It also bears 
reiterating that whether the identification was “reliable” (applying the 
Court’s definition of the term) ultimately does determine admissibility, but 
the Court’s definition of reliability omits the critical factors of police 




Some state courts have tweaked the Manson test by discarding factors 
that have been shown not to correlate with reliability and incorporating 
 
193 Id. at 610–13 (explaining that identification does not violate due process unless a 
threshold finding is made that police used suggestive practices; thus, courts do not reach the 
reliability issue unless the police are found to have acted improperly). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 612. 
196 Here I refer to “the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the 
crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the 
criminal, . . . and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.”  Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972); see also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 104 
(1977). 
197 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199; Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 611 n.44, 613. 
198 See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, supra note 10, at 1501–03 (cross-racial 
identifications and age); Judicial Blindness, supra note 111, at 644 (witness intoxication and 
age). 
199 See Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 612. 
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important factors that do bear on reliability.
200
  These judicial fixes have not 
gone so far as to mandate that police follow best practices. 
In its landmark decision of State v. Henderson, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court completely sidestepped the Manson due process test for 
identifications on the grounds that it fails to meet any of the reliability goals 
set for it.  Instead the court replaced the test with a mandate for pretrial 




In short, neither the “voluntariness” test for confessions nor the 
“reliability” test for identifications ultimately protects against unreliable 
evidence.  The many wrongful convictions produced by confessions and 




B. CURRENT PRACTICES IN RELIABILITY SCREENING FOR LAY 
WITNESS TESTIMONY 
While police-generated witness testimony has not traditionally been 
subject to effective reliability screening, there is certainly precedent for 
such screening in relation to other types of evidence.  The most instructive 
example involves the testimony of the lay witness whose memory has been 
hypnotically refreshed.  The Supreme Court found that the preferred 
approach is for courts to conduct pretrial reliability screening to ensure that 
the evidence has been generated by professionals following accepted 
protocols. 
Hypnotically refreshed witness testimony raises reliability concerns 
strikingly similar to those raised by police-generated witness testimony: (1) 
hypnosis makes a witness more vulnerable to the memory-distorting effects 
of suggestion; (2) biased interrogators may use suggestive questioning in 
order to elicit certain desired statements; (3) the process of suggestive 
questioning of a hypnotized subject may cause the subject to 
 
200 Id. at 623–26. 
201 For a full discussion of the Court’s opinion in State v. Henderson, see infra notes 
316–25 and accompanying text. 
202 A few states have abandoned the federal test and instead apply a per se exclusionary 
rule for unnecessarily suggestive identifications.  See Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 
36, at 623 (Massachusetts, New York, and Wisconsin (only for show-ups in Wisconsin)).  
Only the Utah Supreme Court has so modified the Manson test as to make it consistent with 
scientific studies by excluding the witness confidence prong and adding other critical 
considerations such as cross-racial identifications and police suggestion.  Id. at 625–26. 
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“confabulate”;
203
 and thus (4) a witness may experience a heightened and 
unwarranted degree of confidence in the memory.
204
 
In Rock v. Arkansas, when the defense offered to introduce the 
defendant’s own hypnotically refreshed testimony, the prosecution filed a 
motion to exclude the testimony, and the trial court held a reliability hearing 
to determine its admissibility.
205
  The trial court, applying a per se rule 
excluding such testimony as unreliable, limited the defendant’s testimony to 
memories that had been shared with the examiner before hypnosis.
206
  In 
overturning the defendant’s conviction, the Supreme Court found that such 
a per se exclusion violated the defendant’s right to present a meaningful 
defense.
207
  In lieu of categorical exclusion on grounds of unreliability, the 
Court suggested a case-by-case judicial assessment of reliability.
208
  The 
Court clearly contemplated that trial courts should exercise their discretion 




The Court pointed to the use of procedural safeguards as a means of 
reducing inaccuracies in the testimony.  The Court stated: 
One set of suggested guidelines calls for hypnosis to be performed only by a 
psychologist or psychiatrist with special training in its use and who is independent of 
the investigation.  These procedures reduce the possibility that biases will be 
communicated to the hypersuggestive subject by the hypnotist.  Suggestion will be 
less likely also if the hypnosis is conducted in a neutral setting with no one present but 
the hypnotist and the subject.  Tape or video recording of all interrogations, before, 
during, and after hypnosis, can help reveal if leading questions were asked.
210
 
Thus, the Court indicated that in assessing the reliability of the 
evidence, lower courts may consider whether recommended procedural 
 
203 To confabulate means to “fill in the details from the imagination in order to make an 
answer more coherent and complete.”  Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 60 (1987). 
204 See Daniel R. Webert, Note, Are the Courts in a Trance? Approaches to the 
Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Witness Testimony in Light of Empirical Evidence, 
40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1301, 1304–06 (2003).  One expert testified that hypnotized subjects 
display the same degree of suggestibility and the same tendency to confabulate or to develop 
unwarranted confidence in their memories as witnesses who undergo traditional 
interrogation techniques.  Id. at 1314. 
205 Rock, 483 U.S. at 47. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 62. 
208 Id. at 61. 
209 For example, the role of the trial court in ruling on admissibility is clearly 
communicated in the following statement: “The State would be well within its powers if it 
established guidelines to aid trial courts in the evaluation of posthypnosis testimony and it 
may be able to show that testimony in a particular case is so unreliable that exclusion is 
justified.”  Id. 
210 Id. at 60. 
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safeguards were followed.  These include the use of trained interviewers, 
non-suggestive questioning, independence of the interviewer from the 
investigation, and audio or videotaping of the entire interrogation.  These 
guidelines bear an eerie resemblance to those proposed for confessions, 
informant statements, and eyewitness identification evidence.
211
  The Court 
also noted that the evidence can be tested by more traditional means, such 
as the presence of corroborating evidence, as well as typical trial safeguards 
such as cross-examination, jury instructions, and expert witnesses.
212
 
Courts have also occasionally conducted reliability hearings when the 
prosecution offers the testimony of child victims in sexual assault cases.
213
  
The use of child-victim testimony raises concerns similar to those raised by 
police-generated testimony.
214
  When young children are questioned about 
possible victimization, research has shown that overly zealous and 
suggestive questioning can cause children to make false allegations of 
sexual assault.
215
  Scholars have called for a variety of reforms (many of 
 
211 See supra Part II.B. 
212 Rock, 483 U.S. at 61. 
213 See generally Ashish S. Joshi, Taint Hearing: Scientific and Legal Underpinnings, 34 
CHAMPION 36 (2010) (arguing that courts should determine the admissibility of child-witness 
testimony on the basis of Rule 602, which disqualifies a witness who does not testify from 
personal knowledge). 
214 There are differences between the use of police-generated witness testimony and the 
statements of child victims that may suggest the need for different remedies.  For example, 
with young child victims, the first persons to question them about the possible assaults are 
family members or teachers, not law enforcement agents.  Other individuals often involved 
in questioning include doctors, nurses, and social workers.  Most often the first questioners 
are not trained to conduct interviews with child victims, nor are they equipped to videotape 
the interviews.  See Kimberly Y. Chin, “Minute and Separate”: Considering the 
Admissibility of Videotaped Forensic Interviews in Child Sexual Abuse Cases After 
Crawford and Davis, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 67, 84–85 (2010).  Another difference is 
that in cases of alleged child abuse, a wrongful conviction usually means that no crime 
occurred, whereas erroneous eyewitness identifications and false confessions produce 
convictions of the wrong person.  See Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Role of the Social Sciences 
in Preventing Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1271, 1284 (2005). 
On the question of how jurors perceive child-witness testimony, some studies suggest 
that jurors tend to view them as unreliable due to suggestibility.  See Chin, supra at 85.  
However, other research indicates that jurors are likely to believe that a young child will not 
fabricate allegations of sexual abuse, even when the evidence shows that the interviewer 
suggested that something sexual occurred.  See McMurtrie, supra at 1284–85.  Thus, it is not 
entirely clear whether jurors are as likely to credit unreliable child-witness evidence as they 
are to credit unreliable police-generated witness testimony.  See infra notes 298–07 and 
accompanying text. 
215 See Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific 
Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. Rev. 33, 71 (2000) (summarizing data 
showing a broad consensus that young children are highly suggestible and vulnerable to 
strongly suggestive questioning); Jean Montoya, Something Not So Funny Happened on the 
Way to Conviction: The Pretrial Interrogation of Child Witnesses, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 927, 
2012] POLICE-GENERATED TESTIMONY 371 
which have improved the quality of child-witness testimony
216
) and for 
courts to conduct “taint” hearings to determine the reliability of the child’s 
statements.
217
  Although courts do not often conduct taint hearings,
218
 when 
they do, they generally invoke Rule 602 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
which conditions a witness’s competency to testify on the witness’s ability 
to testify from personal knowledge,
219
 or the Due Process Clause.
220
  These 
hearings have been conducted only in cases in which the child will testify, 
but in many cases the children do not testify.
221
  Instead, prosecutors offer 
the testimony of adult witnesses who testify to the child’s prior statements 
regarding the sexual assault.  The hearsay rules permit a child’s statements 
to be introduced by other witnesses,
222
 just as other hearsay rules allow 
 
933–40 (1993) (addressing social science research showing that suggestive pretrial 
“interrogation” of child witnesses can unwittingly manufacture false accusations); John E.B. 
Myers, Taint Hearings for Child Witnesses? A Step in the Wrong Direction, 46 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 873, 880–84 (1994) (noting a prevalence of overzealousness and excessive use of 
leading questions in interviews of children regarding possible sexual assault). 
On a related note, witnesses with mental disabilities may also be vulnerable to the 
same types of issues that apply to child-witness testimony.  For a discussion of the 
challenges facing a mentally disabled victim and witness in a sexual assault case, see 
generally Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women 
with Mental Disabilities: Evidentiary and Procedural Issues, 52 MCGILL L.J. 515 (2007). 
216 See Myrna S. Raeder, Distrusting Young Children Who Allege Sexual Abuse in 
Criminal and Maltreatment Cases: Why Stereotypes Don’t Die and Ways to Facilitate Child 
Testimony, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 239, 242–46 (2010) (addressing changes to protocols that 
have eliminated suggestive questioning of children and highlighting research that refutes 
other studies on the unreliability or suggestibility of young children). 
217 See Joshi, supra note 213, at 36 (calling for taint hearings to ascertain whether the 
child witness is competent to testify from personal knowledge); Ceci & Friedman, supra 
note 215, at 86–106 (addressing improvements in taint hearings, hearsay rules, use of expert 
witnesses, and videotaping); Montoya, supra note 215, at 940–86 (arguing for the 
videotaping of child-victim interviews and reform of the hearsay rules).  However, in an 
article that predates most DNA exonerations, another author rejects reliability hearings 
(called “taint hearings”) for child witnesses who have undergone interviewing regarding 
allegations of sexual assault on the basis that such hearings will make it more difficult to 
obtain convictions in these cases, thus putting children at greater risk of sexual assault.  
Myers, supra note 215, at 889.  The author reached this conclusion despite acknowledging 
that taint hearings would improve the interviewing techniques used by government agents 
and safeguard fundamental fairness.  Id. at 888–902. 
218 In most cases, either the child is old enough to testify without raising the concerns 
about the suggestibility of very young children, or the child need not testify at all.  See also 
infra note 222 and accompanying text. 
219 See Joshi, supra note 213, at 38–40 (citing cases). 
220 See Myers, supra note 215, at 884–89 (discussing a seminal New Jersey Supreme 
Court decision, State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994)). 
221 See Ceci & Friedman, supra note 215, at 93; Chin, supra note 214, at 86. 
222 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide hearsay exceptions for the out-of-court 
statements of declarants that are made “for [purposes of] medical diagnosis or treatment.”  
FED. R. EVID. 803(4).  There is disagreement among lower courts, however, as to whether 
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police officers or informants to testify to the prior statements of 
defendants.
223
  Thus, like police-generated witness testimony, child-victim 
statements made by adult witnesses become routinely admissible by 
operation of the hearsay rules, without any judicial reliability screening. 
Other evidence rules have required rigorous reliability screening for 
various other types of lay witness testimony; however, with few exceptions, 
these rigorous standards in criminal cases have mostly applied to witnesses 
proffered by one party—the defense.
224
  What is most remarkable about this 
 
this exception should admit statements regarding the identity of the perpetrator as those 
statements may not be pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment.  CHRISTOPHER B. 
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.42, at 837–39 (3d ed. 2003).  The 
statements of children to doctors, nurses, and possibly social workers can generally qualify 
for admission under this exception.  Statements to family members about current symptoms 
and pains, or emotions such as distress or fear are usually admissible under the hearsay 
exception for statements of a declarant’s “then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, 
or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as . . . mental feeling, pain, or 
bodily health).”  FED. R. EVID. 803(3).  Again, this exception would not ordinarily permit 
statements relating to past events, such as the cause of the current feelings or condition.  The 
exception is restricted to “then existing” feelings and does not allow statements “of memory 
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.”  Id.  If the statements are made close in 
time to the time when the assault took place, the statements may also qualify under the 
exception for excited utterances (“statement[s] relating to a startling event or condition, 
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement [caused by the event or 
condition]”).  FED. R. EVID. 803(2).  See generally Myrna S. Raeder, Finding the Proper 
Balance in Hearsay Policy: The Uniform Rules Attempt to Stem the Hearsay Tide in 
Criminal Cases Without Prohibiting All Nontraditional Hearsay, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 631, 634, 
639–41 (2001) (arguing that courts have read hearsay exceptions like excited utterances and 
medical statements in order to allow children’s statements to be heard and advocating for the 
Uniform Rules of Evidence approach, which provides better guidance to courts and better 
assures trustworthiness). 
The Supreme Court’s approach to the Confrontation Clause poses an obstacle to the 
admission of the hearsay statements of children in sexual assault cases when they are made 
for the purpose of investigating a crime.  See Chin, supra note 214, at 93–98.  Statements 
made to police officers or social workers, if made for the purpose of reporting a crime, are 
considered “testimonial.”  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).  Testimonial 
statements are not admissible in a criminal case unless the witness is unavailable to testify 
and there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination.  Id.  Other nontestimonial 
statements made for purposes other than reporting a crime to law enforcement may be 
admissible under the hearsay exceptions, see supra this note, and the Confrontation Clause 
would not preclude admission. 
223 See infra notes 275–84.  The reliability issues that surround child-witness hearsay 
statements parallel those of police-generated witness testimony.  Although it is beyond the 
scope of this Article, it would appear that many of the same arguments for pretrial reliability 
hearings regarding police-generated witness testimony can also be made with regard to the 
hearsay statements of child witnesses. 
224 Other authors have noted the apparent bias in admitting prosecution evidence and 
excluding defense evidence.  See, e.g., Yvette J. Bessent, Not So Fast: Admissibility of 
Polygraph Evidence and Repressed Memory Evidence When Offered by the Accused, 55 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 975, 975–76 (2001) (finding a “strong indication” that admittance depends on 
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apparent lack of evenhandedness is that the imbalance ought to run in the 
opposite direction.  First, it is of course the government’s burden to 
establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
225
  For a trial to 
be fair, the government’s evidence should meet reasonable standards of 
reliability.  Second, the exclusion of defense evidence implicates the 
constitutional right of an accused to present a meaningful defense.
226
  In 
contrast, the government and parties to a civil suit can assert no protected 
right to admit evidence.  Thus, one would expect that reliability screening 
would apply with greater force to the prosecution than to the defense, but, 
ironically, the opposite is apparently true.
227
 
The three types of prosecution evidence considered here undergo 
virtually no reliability screening, but defense witness testimony is routinely 
excluded or limited on reliability grounds.
228
  In fact, there are several 
instances in which the same type of evidence may be admissible if offered 
by the prosecution but inadmissible on unreliability grounds if offered by 
the defense.  The testimony of a jailhouse informant provides a poignant 
example.  If a jailhouse cellmate steps forward and offers to testify for the 
prosecution that a defendant admitted committing a crime, this evidence 
 
which party seeks to offer the evidence and that courts admit polygraph evidence when 
offered by the prosecution but exclude it when offered by the defense); D. Michael Risinger, 
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 
64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 131–32 (2000) (rejecting a general pro-prosecution bias, but nonetheless 
finding “serious specific pro-prosecution disparities” such as the nearly universal admission 
of “summarizational” or educational expert witnesses offered by the prosecution and the 
exclusion of a majority of such experts offered by the defense); see also Katherine 
Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial by Jury and the Requirement of Proof Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom About Excluding Defense 
Evidence, 86 GEO. L.J. 621, 631–32 (1998) (arguing that state and federal courts too often 
exclude defense evidence of third-party exculpatory statements on unreliability grounds). 
225 See Goldwasser, supra note 224, at 633–36 (addressing the conflict between the 
exclusion of defense evidence and the principles that underlie the burden of proof in criminal 
cases). 
226 A defendant in a criminal case ostensibly enjoys a special due process right to offer 
evidence, deriving from the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth 
Amendment.  See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006). 
227 See Goldwasser, supra note 224, at 635 (arguing that exclusion of prosecution 
evidence on unreliability grounds is consistent with the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, whereas a reliability-based exclusion of defense evidence is not). 
228 The same goes for expert witnesses as well.  Forensic experts offered by the 
government are routinely admitted, in many cases despite the fact that they fail to meet the 
reliability standards set forth in Daubert.  Defense experts, however, fare far less well.  See 
Risinger, supra note 224, at 131–35 (discussing an empirical study finding pro-prosecution 
disparity in admitting “summarizational” or “educational” experts).  Much of the blame for 
the admission of faulty forensic science can be placed at the feet of the defense bar, which 
largely failed to challenge the bogus science.  See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 11, at 2. 
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will encounter no evidentiary obstacles whatsoever.
229
  However, if a 
jailhouse cellmate offers to testify for the defense regarding a third party’s 
confession to the crime for which the defendant is being tried, this evidence 
will normally not be admitted unless the defense also shows “corroborating 
circumstances that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.”
230
 
The case law on the “right to present a defense” reveals just how many 
evidentiary rules have attempted to place special limits on the right of 
criminal defendants to present evidence, without imposing those same 
restrictions on prosecution evidence.
231
  Although the Supreme Court has 
struck down or softened many of these restrictions, one is left to wonder 
why state evidentiary rules have attempted strict reliability gatekeeping 
only for defense evidence.
232
  In the end, the courts either have it half right 
 
229 As offered by the prosecution, the informant’s testimony about the defendant’s own 
statement is admissible under the hearsay rules as an “[o]pposing [p]arty’s [s]tatement.”  See 
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). 
230 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(A) admits hearsay statements made by a declarant who is 
unavailable to testify and that are “against interest,” which as applied here means the 
statement “had so great a tendency . . . to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability 
. . . .”  The declarant in this scenario is a third party who would presumably invoke the Fifth 
Amendment privilege not to testify regarding matters that would incriminate the person.  
Thus, the declarant is considered unavailable.  See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1).  For all other 
statements against interest, the exception requires only that the statement be “against 
interest” and that the declarant be “unavailable.”  However, an additional requirement 
applies to third-party statements offered to expose the declarant to criminal liability (thereby 
presumably relieving the defendant of liability): the statement must also be supported by 
“corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness.”  See FED. R. EVID. 
804(b)(3)(B). 
231 The rules considered by the Court over the years vary from categorical exclusion of 
certain types of defense evidence to rules that require certain guarantees of trustworthiness 
for the evidence to be admitted.  See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302–03 (1973) 
(holding that a defendant’s right to present a defense is violated by hearsay rules that 
combined to exclude defense witnesses who would testify to a third-party’s confession and 
prevented the defense from cross-examining that same third party); Washington v. Texas, 
388 U.S. 14, 22, 23 (1967) (striking down the categorical exclusion of testimony provided by 
persons charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories in the same crime when testifying 
as witnesses for each other, but which allowed the prosecution to call accomplices to testify 
against the defendant). 
232 Some attribute rules that disadvantage defendants and make convictions easier to 
obtain to a fear that defendants in criminal cases may too easily evade prosecution by 
fabricating a defense.  See, e.g., David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the 
Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 359, 376 (1985) (defending the felony 
murder rule, which eliminates the requirement that the government prove criminal intent to 
kill, on the ground that “any other approach would unduly reward perjury [because] [t]he 
denial of harmful intent in such a situation is too facile.”).  The prospect of easy acquittals 
due to fabricated defenses that may raise reasonable doubts may lead some to cut defendants 
off at the pass by restricting the right to raise a defense at all.  See, e.g., People v. Williams, 
841 P.2d 961, 971 (Cal. 1992) (Mosk, J., concurring) (“Beneath the surface of the majority 
opinion, there seems a fear that . . . a defendant may too easily fabricate a reasonable-and-
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by screening defense evidence while erroneously failing to apply the same 
standards to prosecution evidence, or the courts have gotten it completely 
backwards since defendants should have a greater right to offer evidence 
given the defendant’s constitutional right to present a meaningful 
defense.
233
  Either way, it is obvious that reliability screening of police-
generated witness testimony is long overdue. 
IV. PRETRIAL RELIABILITY HEARINGS FOR POLICE-GENERATED 
WITNESS TESTIMONY 
Critical evidence such as a confession or an eyewitness identification 
makes or breaks the government’s case.  Studies of DNA exonerations and 
jury behavior show that there are “islands of trouble” among the sea of 
criminal cases.
234
  Suggestive or coercive tactics by the police can lead 
witnesses to make erroneous or false statements, especially when the 
witnesses are particularly vulnerable, like juveniles and the intellectually 
disabled or mentally ill.
235
  Police officers can also contaminate the process 
by revealing information about the crime or suspect to the witness, 
prompting the witness to incorporate that information into his or her own 
statement.  Evaluating the reliability of police-generated testimony requires 
a thorough understanding of the dangers of police–witness interactions and 
the emerging best practices for addressing those dangers.  Although not as 
complex as evaluating the myriad types of scientific evidence, the task of 
understanding the pitfalls of eyewitness identifications, custodial 
interrogations, and the use of informants cannot practicably be taught to 
jurors during the course of a trial, nor would it be an efficient use of trial 
resources.  Thus, the gatekeeping role rightly lies with judges. 
Common sense tells us this gatekeeping should occur as early in the 
litigation process as possible.
236
  For confessions based on custodial 
 
honest-belief defense through his own false testimony, and should accordingly be denied the 
defense unless he is supported by corroborating evidence.”). 
Findley argues that courts can suffer from the same tunnel vision as police and 
prosecutors.  Instead of a system that protects the innocent, he observes an overall skewing 
of the judicial system in favor of the government.  Findley, supra note 11, at 896. 
233 See Goldwasser, supra note 224, at 635–36. 
234 I borrow the term “islands of trouble” from Michael Risinger who used it to describe 
the “substructured” nature of wrongful convictions, which have been found to occur more 
often within some types of crimes, or under some circumstances, than others.  See Risinger, 
supra note 42, at 785. 
235 See supra notes 110–15 and accompanying text. 
236 See generally Findley, supra note 11, at 911 (arguing that rules of evidence already 
incorporate some forms of gatekeeping for reliability).  Among advocacy groups, the Justice 
Project had recommended pretrial reliability hearings for jailhouse informants and 
confessions.  See supra note 126. 
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interrogations, Leo and Garrett have each made the case for pretrial 
reliability hearings.
237
  Leo argues that the reliability issue should be 
considered only after the constitutional voluntariness issue.
238
  He states that 
since truth or falsity is not relevant to the voluntariness inquiry, the court 
should not determine “reliability” first (in effect, finding the confession 
likely to be true), as that might improperly influence the courts’ decisions 
on voluntariness.
239
  Similar proposals have been made regarding informant 
testimony and eyewitness identifications.  Natapoff has called for pretrial 
reliability hearings for police informant testimony.
240
  Thus, experts writing 
in each of these fields have called upon the judiciary to protect the rights of 
the innocent by carefully screening key prosecution evidence before trial. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s momentous decision in State v. 
Henderson requires pretrial reliability hearings for eyewitness 
identifications obtained by suggestive means.
241
  In embracing a new 
approach to judicial screening for identifications, New Jersey became the 
first state to require courts to engage in pretrial reliability hearings for a 
commonly admitted type of lay witness testimony in all criminal cases.
242
  
The court adopted the requirement upon the recommendations of a special 
master that the court had appointed to conduct extensive hearings.  The 
Henderson opinion draws upon the voluminous scientific research and the 
testimony of numerous scientific experts considered by the special master, 
as well as the recommendations of the parties.  As such, the decision 
provides an outstanding summary of the scientific literature on eyewitness 
identification as applied to criminal cases.  It provides excellent guidance 
for lower courts in New Jersey on how to conduct pretrial reliability 
hearings for this type of evidence, and it can serve as a model for state 
courts across the country. 
 
237 See LEO, supra note 10, at 289–91.  Garrett argues that courts could question the 
ordinary presumption of reliability of confessions by assessing whether crucial facts were in 
fact volunteered by the defendant.  Garrett, supra note 73, at 1111.  The assessment would 
benefit most from access to a video recording of the interrogation, which is the leading 
reform proposed for interrogations.  See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. 
238 LEO, supra note 10, at 290. 
239 Id. 
240 See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 190–91, 194–95. 
241 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); see also State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930 (N.J. 2011) (companion 
case applying the Henderson framework under state rules of evidence to eyewitness 
identifications tainted by private-party suggestion).  For a full discussion of the Henderson 
decision, see infra notes 315–24 and accompanying text. 
242 Previously, Illinois was the only state to impose a statutory requirement to conduct 
pretrial reliability hearings for informant testimony, but this requirement applied only to 
capital cases.  See supra note 183.  With the recent repeal of the death penalty in Illinois, this 
provision is no longer needed.  See supra note 8. 
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The breakthrough in New Jersey, while certainly a milestone, does not 
necessarily mean that other states will follow suit, and currently even New 
Jersey does not provide such hearings for confessions or informant 
testimony.
243
  A critic of pretrial reliability hearings might argue that such 
hearings introduce inefficiencies by creating a trial within a trial and that 
they are unnecessary because trial procedures like cross-examination, jury 
instructions, and expert witnesses can adequately safeguard against 
wrongful convictions.  One might also challenge the use of such a hearing 
as invading the province of the jury and misunderstanding the proper role of 
the judge as gatekeeper.  Finally, a constant worry about reforms aimed at 
curbing wrongful convictions is that they will limit the availability of good, 
reliable evidence and impair the government’s ability to obtain convictions 
in violent crime cases, thereby jeopardizing the public safety. 
The following sections of the Article challenge this critique and 
outline the doctrinal basis for a court’s authority to hold such pretrial 
hearings on reliability for all three forms of police-generated witness 
testimony considered here.  They draw on the Henderson decision, as well 
as the lessons of the DNA exoneration cases, to provide guidance on the 
considerations that courts could take into account in assessing each form of 
evidence.  By holding hearings on reliability, courts will incentivize the 
police and prosecutors to adopt practices that promote reliability: avoiding 
contamination of witness testimony; using less coercive or suggestive 
tactics, especially with vulnerable individuals; and properly documenting 
interviews, preferably through videotaping.  By establishing best practices 
as the benchmark by which courts will review police practices in these 
areas, courts also necessarily broaden the scope of pretrial discovery to 
include the procedures by which these critical forms of evidence are 
produced.  The hearings afford the court the opportunity to fashion 
appropriate intermediate approaches to less-than-reliable identifications, in 
addition to the all-or-nothing decision to admit or exclude.
244
  As was 
explicitly mandated in Henderson, trial courts can produce factual findings 
at pretrial reliability hearings that serve to foster effective appellate review 




243 Illinois represents a minor exception for informant testimony.  Id. 
244 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 915, 918–19 (making this argument in the limited context of 
identification testimony). 
245 Id. at 928. 
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A. DISCOVERY AND PRETRIAL HEARINGS ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF 
EVIDENCE 
The early stages of the criminal trial process involve the gathering and 
evaluation of evidence, among other things.  Defense attorneys normally 
file motions for discovery soon after a defendant is arraigned.  This motion 
requests information pertaining to any and all pretrial identifications of the 
defendant by any eyewitnesses.
246
  It also requests impeachment material, 
information about witnesses, and information about any and all statements 
attributed to the defendant by any witnesses.  Any reform in the area of 
confessions, informant statements, and eyewitness identifications should 
begin with improved discovery mechanisms,
247
 especially in the area of 
informant testimony.
248
  A reliability challenge necessitates that defense 
counsel knows the circumstances under which the evidence was generated 
by the police.  Thus, it necessarily encompasses a requirement that the 
government provide adequate discovery.
249
 
In general, criminal discovery has not well served the function of 
eliminating trial by surprise, and this failing puts the innocent in extreme 
jeopardy.
250
  The problem is most acute with regard to the use of police 
informants.  Natapoff argues that prosecutors should have an affirmative 
duty to produce the pertinent impeachment information regarding any 
police-informant witness.
251
  For various reasons, law enforcement may be 
reluctant to provide such information, even to prosecutors, and prosecutors 
 
246 See Wise, Fishman & Safer, supra note 1, at 450–51. 
247 See generally Stephanos Bibas et al., New Perspectives on Brady and Other 
Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1961 (2010) (reporting on the recommendations of working groups of academics, 
judges, social science experts, and practitioners regarding best practices for criminal 
discovery). 
248 See infra notes 251–52 and accompanying text. 
249 See, e.g., Henderson, 27 A.3d at 923 (noting that by expanding upon the factors 
courts should consider when reviewing the admissibility of eyewitness identifications, the 
court had effectively broadened the defense right to pretrial discovery). 
250 Findley speaks even more broadly about the defendant’s general disadvantage in 
evidence gathering: 
[C]riminal defendants are at a vast disadvantage in their ability to investigate and develop 
evidence.  For the most part, the only way defendants can now gain access to crime scene 
evidence is through discovery, which means they must depend on the prosecutor to identify and 
disclose such information as the prosecutor believes the defense is entitled to have.  But 
discovery is notoriously limited in criminal cases, especially when compared to the extensive and 
wide-open discovery available in civil cases.  Ironically, litigants fighting over money have far 
more access to the facts and evidence than does an innocent person wrongly accused and facing 
many years or life in prison, or even death. 
Findley, supra note 11, at 901 (footnotes omitted). 
251 See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 74–76, 192. 
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With regard to confessions, the rules of evidence require that courts 
hold hearings out of the hearing of the jury on the admissibility of 
confessions.
253
  Thus, it makes sense that the hearing would take place 
pretrial, at the same time as the likely challenge on constitutional grounds.  
The rules also call for holding hearings outside of the hearing of the jury for 
other preliminary matters as “justice so requires.”
254
  In cases in which 
eyewitness identification or informant testimony is the critical item of 
evidence, and where there is no reliable corroborating evidence, the 
identification or informant evidence poses a great risk of wrongly 
convicting the innocent defendant.
255
  Thus, the “interests of justice” surely 
require hearings outside of the presence of the jury. 
The nature of all three forms of police-generated witness testimony 
addressed here also calls for the hearings to be held pretrial.
256
  If police-
generated witness testimony is excluded on reliability grounds, in many 
cases the prosecutor will move to dismiss the case.  Early resolution for an 
innocent defendant avoids an unnecessarily prolonged ordeal and 
maximizes judicial efficiency.  Pretrial rulings also allow the parties to 
prepare for voir dire and trial. 
B. JUDGING RELIABILITY UNDER THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The rules of evidence vest courts with the discretion to exclude 
evidence that is shown to be both potentially unreliable and difficult for the 
jury to evaluate, thus posing a greater risk of precipitating an inaccurate 
verdict.  The Supreme Court has made this abundantly clear in its 
application of the rules of evidence to scientific evidence.  In Daubert,
257
 
the Court addressed the applicable standards for admitting scientific expert 
testimony.  Rule 702 specifically governs scientific evidence and requires 
that it be based on valid scientific knowledge and that it will be helpful to 
the jury.
258
  The Court interpreted Rule 702 as calling for a reliability 
analysis.
259
  Presumably, the Court could have relied solely on Rule 702, 
but instead it also invoked Rule 403 in support of a judicial role to assess 
 
252 Id. 
253 See FED. R. EVID. 104(c). 
254 See FED. R. EVID. 104(c)(3). 
255 See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text. 
256 See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text. 
257 Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
258 FED. R. EVID. 702.   
259 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–93. 
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reliability.
260
  The Court thereby linked its finding that Rule 702 requires 
“reliability” with Rule 403’s grant of authority to courts to exclude relevant 
evidence where its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risks 
of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury.
261
  The Court justified the 
heightened judicial oversight on the grounds that the nature of scientific 
opinion offered by an expert makes it at once more powerful and more 
difficult to evaluate.
262
  The Court appropriately invoked Rule 403 as 
grounds for judicial gatekeeping on reliability because the rule applies in 
conjunction with other more specific rules of evidence and because its 
underlying purpose is to secure the integrity of the trial process.
263
 
A similar reading of Rules 701 and 602 gives trial courts the discretion 
to conduct gatekeeping for lay witness testimony that presents grave risks 
of misleading the jury.  Confessions, informant testimony, and eyewitness 
identification testimony are introduced as lay witness testimony.
264
  Rule 
701 requires that where lay witnesses offer opinion testimony, the 
testimony must be “rationally based on the witness’s perception” and 
“helpful to . . . determining a fact in issue.”
265
  Rule 602 provides that 
witnesses must testify from “personal knowledge.”
266
  Eyewitnesses provide 
opinion testimony regarding the identity of the culprit, and experience 
shows that those opinions may be greatly affected by suggestive 
practices.
267
  Similarly, when police officers or government informants 
testify to a defendant’s incriminating statements they inherently 
communicate their own opinions that that defendant spoke voluntarily and 
 
260 Id. at 594–95.  Rule 403 provides: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”  FED. R. EVID. 403. 
261 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594–95.  
262 Id. at 595. 
263 See also infra notes 269–72 and accompanying text. 
264 Lay witnesses are defined as all witnesses who are not expert witnesses.  See FED. R. 
EVID. 701.  In the common parlance of trial practice, these are considered “fact witnesses” in 
that they provide the testimony proving the facts of the case. 
265 See FED. R. EVID. 701. 
266 See FED. R. EVID. 602. 
267 The Advisory Committee’s Notes contemplated that statements of identity and other 
estimates of matters such as size, weight, and distance would normally be admissible as 
opinions under Rule 701.  See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (2000 
Amendment).  In interpreting a different rule of evidence, the Supreme Court refused to 
differentiate “factual findings” from “conclusions or opinion,” instead determining that 
“factual findings” include “conclusions or opinions that flow from a factual investigation” 
and not simply “facts.”  See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163–64 (1988).  
Thus, courts can properly invoke Rule 701 in considering the admissibility of ostensibly 
“factual” statements that experience has shown are more akin to opinions that draw on a 
variety of factors and that can be affected by outside influences such as suggestive practices. 
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sincerely in implicating himself.  Rules 701 and 602, considered together, 
authorize courts to screen such testimony to determine its reliability based 
on the extent to which the police followed best practices in obtaining the 
witness’s testimony.  In State v. Chen, a companion case to Henderson in 




As was done in Daubert, courts should also rely on Rule 403 as 
authority for reliability screening of police-generated lay witness testimony.  
Rule 403 “represents a key organizing principle for understanding the 
practical application and ethos of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”
269
  Stated 
more as a general principle than a specific rule, Rule 403, more than any 
other rule, makes the rules adaptable so that they retain force even under 
circumstances unforeseen to the drafters.  It “epitomizes the trial judge’s 
vast discretion in admitting or excluding evidence, a hallmark of our 
judicial system.”
270
  As one authority explains, Rule 403 gives courts 
leeway to exclude “relevant evidence [that may] confuse, or worse, mislead 
a trier of fact who is not properly equipped to judge the probative worth of 
the evidence.”
271
  Indeed, courts uniformly understand Rule 403 as a means 
of assuring fundamental fairness in the trial process and in so doing 




This reading of the rules of evidence dovetails with the objectives of 
the rules which call on courts to construe the rules to “promote the 
development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and 
securing a just determination.”
273
  The rules are thus intended to adapt with 
advances in knowledge so as to safeguard the integrity of the trial process. 
A finding that police-generated lay witness testimony presents lesser 
risks of unreliability might not justify exclusion.  Such a finding would still 
be useful to the trial court in fashioning jury instructions that could be given 
during or after trial or in admitting expert testimony.  The drafters 
envisioned that courts would weigh the efficacy of giving jury instructions 




268 State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 937 (N.J. 2011). 
269 Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487, 1512 (2005). 
270 Id. at 1513. 
271 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 185 at 279 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). 
272 See Orenstein, supra note 269, at 1517–18. 
273 FED. R. EVID. 102. 
274 See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note (“In reaching a decision whether to 
exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable 
effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.”). 
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Gatekeeping for police-generated lay witness testimony would provide 
more effective protection against wrongful conviction than the present free 
admission of the testimony under the hearsay rules.  All three types of 
police-generated lay witness testimony addressed herein involve the 
admission of hearsay statements.  Prosecutors offer the testimony of police 
officers and informants who testify to the defendant’s incriminating 
statements, and eyewitnesses testify to their own previous statements 
identifying the defendant.
275
  A defendant’s incriminating statements are 
admitted as “[a]n [o]pposing [p]arty’s [s]tatement”;
276
 an eyewitness’s 
testimony about an earlier statement identifying the defendant is admitted 
as a “statement [that] . . . identifies a person.”
277
  Normally, the rule against 
hearsay bars witnesses from testifying to statements previously made “out 
of court” by themselves or others when offered to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted.
278
  The rule against hearsay rests on reliability grounds.
279
  
However, the rule recognizes many exceptions for hearsay bearing indicia 
of trustworthiness.
280
  Unlike other hearsay exceptions, a party’s own 
statements (previously called “admissions”) and statements of identification 
are categorically admissible despite the fact that they possess absolutely no 
guarantees of trustworthiness.
281
  With regard to admissions, these are 
admitted instead on the ground that the maker of the statements is a party to 
the litigation (here, the defendant), so the party can simply explain or refute 
 
275 See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
276 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). 
277 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C). 
278 See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ means a statement that: (1) the declarant does 
not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”). 
279 The rule against hearsay rests on four principal trustworthiness concerns, which arise 
from the fact that the speaker of the statement is not the person testifying.  First, the speaker 
may have misperceived the condition or event in question, so the witness’s testimony may be 
inaccurate.  See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 222, § 8.2, at 695.  Second, the 
speaker may have had a bad memory about the condition or event at issue.  Id. at 695–96.  
Third, the speaker may not have been sincere about what happened but may have been 
shading the truth or blatantly lying.  Id. at 696.  Fourth, the speaker may have misspoken or 
misunderstood.  Id. 
280 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 272, § 246, at 375. 
281 In a somewhat confusing manner, the hearsay rules have endeavored to make the 
exception for these forms of hearsay so strong that they designate admissions of a party 
opponent and statements of identification as “not hearsay” even though they fit the general 
definition of hearsay.  See FED. R. EVID. 801(d).  The designation as “not hearsay” is 
understood to take these statements outside of the bar against hearsay.  For other forms of 
evidence, the rules simply provide an exception to the rule.  See FED. R. EVID. 803–804.  See 
also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 271, § 254, at 393. 
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the statements.
282
  When offered without reliability guarantees against a 
defendant in a criminal case, the defendant is put in a position where she 
either has to waive the privilege against self-incrimination and take the 
witness stand to refute the validity of the admissions or decline to testify 
and find other means of challenging the evidence.
283
  Many defendants elect 
not to testify because doing so would expose them to crippling 
impeachment on the basis of their prior crimes.
284
  Thus, the fail-safe 
envisioned by the admissions doctrine actually puts the innocent defendant 
between a rock and a hard place: either sacrifice the privilege against self-
incrimination or sacrifice the ability to directly challenge highly persuasive 
yet unreliable evidence.  Natapoff notes that innocent defendants with 
criminal records are most at risk of wrongful conviction and may even feel 




The exception for statements of identification may be said to rest on 
notions of trustworthiness, but here the “trustworthiness” of the prior 
statement of identification is measured solely by comparison to highly 
suggestive in-court identifications.
286
  Typically, a witness will have 
identified the defendant at some point prior to trial as part of the police 
investigation.  The rule reflects a judgment that witnesses should be 
allowed to relate prior identifications and not be limited to highly 
suggestive and unreliable in-court identifications.
287
  The Advisory 
Committee’s Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence find prior 
identifications to be more trustworthy because they are “made at an earlier 
time under less suggestive conditions.”
288
  Prior identifications, being made 
closer in time to the crime, will be more accurate than those done later in 
 
282 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 271, § 254 at 393–94; MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 222, § 8.27, at 767–68. 
283 Necessitating a defendant’s waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination weakens 
the privilege as a protection for the innocent.  The privilege “constitutes one part, but an 
important part, of our accusatorial system which requires that no criminal punishment be 
imposed unless guilt is established by a large quantum of especially reliable evidence” 
produced by the government.  MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 271, § 115, at 179. 
284 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 222, § 6.29, at 492–93. 
285 NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 80. 
286 See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
451, 462–63 (2012) (discussing the traditional preference for evidence of out-of-court 
identification, as opposed to in-court identification testimony). 
287 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 222, § 8.26, at 764–65.  It should be noted that 
witnesses typically also provide an in-court identification, in addition to testifying to the out-
of-court identification.  Indeed, even in the rare case when a court excludes an out-of-court 
identification, courts still allow the witness to make an in-court identification.  For a critique 
of this rule, see Garrett, supra note 286, at 463–64. 
288 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note. 
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time, such as at the trial.
289
  However, the notion that they are made “under 
less suggestive conditions” than an in-court identification does not hold up 
to scrutiny.  For one thing, the prior identification may have been made at a 
one-person show-up, which is just as suggestive as in-court identification.  
Most likely, the drafters had photo arrays and live lineups in mind, but even 




Trustworthiness is also enhanced by the fact that the witness must 
testify and be subject to cross-examination.
 291
  However, while demeanor 
evidence and cross-examination normally provide some opportunity for 
jurors to assess the credibility of a witness’s testimony, here credibility is 
not an issue.  The witnesses are “credible” in the sense of providing 
testimony they believe to be true; they are simply mistaken.  Studies and 
DNA exonerations prove quite clearly that cross-examination is an 
insufficient means to refute the reliability of a misidentification.
292
 
The traditional application of the hearsay rules as the only evidentiary 
screen for police-generated lay witness testimony can no longer be justified.  
Trial courts can invoke Rules 701, 403, and 104(a) as authority for an 
enhanced gatekeeping role.
293
  Daubert made this same argument with 
 
289 See generally Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Forgetting the Once-Seen Face: 
Estimating the Strength of an Eyewitness’s Memory Representation, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL: APPLIED 139, 142 (2008) (providing a meta-analysis of fifty-three “facial memory 
studies” showing that memory strength weakens as time passes). 
290 See supra note 130. 
291 The rule itself actually allows for third parties to testify to the witness’s prior 
identification, without necessitating that the witness testify.  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, 
supra note 222, § 8.26, at 766.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford, however, 
requires as a condition of admissibility that the witness be subject to cross-examination by 
the defendant in order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.  See supra note 222. 
292 See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, supra note 10, at 1516. 
293 A more recent Supreme Court decision further supports the appropriateness of 
judicial oversight of evidentiary reliability under Rule 403.  In Holmes v. South Carolina, the 
Court addressed the constitutionality of a state rule excluding defense evidence of a third 
party’s guilt.  547 U.S. 319, 323 (2006).  Holmes offered the testimony of several witnesses 
who placed another man, Jimmy McCaw White, in the victim’s neighborhood on the 
morning of the attack, as well as four other witnesses who would testify that White had 
either admitted his guilt or acknowledged that Holmes was innocent.  The South Carolina 
evidence rules prevented the defense from offering this testimony, while the rules allowed 
the prosecution to offer witness testimony placing Holmes near the victim’s home within an 
hour of the killing.  The rule excluded evidence of a third party’s guilt “where there is strong 
evidence of [a defendant’s] guilt, especially where there is strong forensic evidence.”  Id. at 
329 (quoting State v. Holmes, 361 S.C. 333, 342 (2004)). 
 The United States Supreme Court overturned Holmes’s conviction, finding that the South 
Carolina rule violated his right to present a defense.  Id. at 331.  However, the decision does 
not require that all evidence of third-party guilt must be admitted.  Instead, the Court 
suggests that the better approach in Holmes’s case would have been to evaluate the proffered 
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respect to scientific evidence.
294
  In fact, the failure to exclude evidence that 
presents heightened risks of unfair prejudice is grounds for reversal.  In Old 
Chief v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court found that the lower 
court had abused its discretion in failing to exclude on Rule 403 grounds 
relevant and otherwise admissible evidence offered to prove an element of 
the offense.
295
  In that case, the concern was that the evidence created an 
unnecessary risk of unfair prejudice that could lead the jury to act on the 
basis of emotion and convict on this improper ground.
296
  The rules of 
evidence empower the courts to screen evidence to ensure that the jury 
hears evidence that not only is relevant but also will not lead the jury to 
decide the case on improper grounds.
297
 
For police-generated lay witness testimony, extensive studies show 
that these types of evidence have a powerful effect on juries and that 
juries—employing only “common sense”—are not effective in evaluating 
the reliability of such evidence.
298
  Wrongful convictions also bring to light 
the fact that jurors may not appreciate the suggestiveness or coercive effects 
of certain police practices.  In a related study, most lay people were shown 
to be incapable of identifying a leading question.
299
  Further, “scientific 
research show[s] that jurors have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors 
and that the effect of many factors on eyewitness accuracy is not a matter of 
 
testimonial evidence under the balancing approach of Rule 403.  Id. at 329.  The Court 
explained:  
While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no 
legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-
established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is 
outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential 
to mislead the jury.   
Id. at 326.  The Court implicitly faulted the South Carolina rule, which did not require the 
trial judge to “focus on the probative value or the potential adverse effects of admitting the 
defense evidence of third-party guilt.”  Id. at 329.  Thus, the Court advocated a case-by-case 
balancing approach under Rule 403 to determining the admissibility of proffered lay 
testimony in a case in which a state rule called for excluding the evidence on reliability 
grounds. 
294 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993). 
295 519 U.S. 172, 177–78 (1997). 
296 Id. at 191–92. 
297 Cf. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(discussing the importance of judicial gatekeeping in toxic tort cases in order that “courts 
administer the Federal Rules of Evidence . . . to achieve the ‘end[s]’ that the Rules 
themselves set forth, not only so that proceedings may be ‘justly determined,’ but also so 
‘that the truth may be ascertained’”). 
298 For a thorough discussion of how jurors lack the ability to evaluate the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications, confessions, and informant testimony, see Findley, supra note 32, 
at 624. 
299 See McMurtrie, supra note 214, at 1285. 
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common sense.”
300
  Even when courts try to correct for these deficiencies 
by allowing expert testimony, other studies show jurors tend to be 
“skeptical of experts, especially defense experts, whose testimony goes 
against what they consider simple common sense.”
301
 
Since eyewitnesses are normally honestly mistaken and often highly 
confident when they testify, jurors have an even harder time evaluating the 
reliability of an identification.  In some cases, both the investigating officer 
and the eyewitness may act with diligence and good faith in trying to obtain 
an accurate identification, and yet the identification may still be 
erroneous.
302
  The use of suggestive procedures, confirmatory feedback, and 
the process of pretrial preparation all serve to increase a witness’s level of 
confidence in the accuracy of the identification.  Thus, if the primary 
proficiency of a jury is to evaluate witness “credibility,” mistaken 
eyewitnesses present a particular challenge because their testimony is 
honest and confident, but totally wrong. 
Police officers who obtain false incriminating statements from a 
suspect also testify honestly, and most likely confidently.  Moreover, they 
testify in uniform, which undoubtedly adds some measure of credibility in 
the minds of most jurors.  Thus, false statements present similar challenges 
for jurors who are asked to determine witness “credibility” and are not 
trained to evaluate the special risks of interrogation practices, especially as 
they apply to vulnerable suspects. 
Indeed, studies also show that jurors do not believe that interrogation 
tactics are likely to elicit false confessions,
303
 so there is a tendency toward 
overreliance on confession evidence.
304
  For this reason, a confession 
obtained under circumstances likely to produce false statements will tend 
not to be rejected by the jury and will be extremely prejudicial to the 
defense.  Suspects who confess falsely sometimes do so because the 
interrogation process so confuses them that they come to believe that they 
must be guilty when they confess.
305
  In these cases, even videotapes of the 
 
300 See Wise, Fishman & Safer, supra note 1, at 453. 
301 See id. at 453–54.  
302 See id. at 437–39, 454–55 (discussing good faith conduct of police and eyewitnesses 
in the erroneous identification of Ronald Cotton in a North Carolina rape case). 
303 See Iris Blandon-Gitlin, Katheryn Sperry & Richard A. Leo, Jurors Believe 
Interrogation Tactics Are Not Likely to Elicit False Confessions: Will Expert Testimony 
Inform Them Otherwise?, 16 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 1 (2010). 
304 Bringing Reliability Back In, supra note 131, at 524 (citing Steven A. Drizin & 
Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 
891, 1003 (2004) and Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False 
Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of 
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998)).  
305 See LEO, supra note 10, at 210–11 (addressing persuaded false confessions). 
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identification process or of the interrogation may not prevent error.  If 
jurors are supposed to determine whether a person’s statement is credible, 
i.e., honest, then these statements would pass muster. 
Finally, when police informants testify falsely, jurors also tend to 
credit their testimony, most likely minimizing the effects of police tactics 
that may tempt or coerce the informants to commit perjury.
306
  Again, 
wrongful convictions have shown jurors to have difficulty determining the 
reliability of informant testimony.  Courts are in a position to evaluate the 
adequacy of discovery about the informant’s background, including any 
prior history of informing, and to determine the degree to which the police 
may have created incentives likely to cause a person to commit perjury.
307
  
Courts might even be receptive to allowing defense experts to testify at a 
pretrial reliability hearing regarding the dangers of informant testimony. 
Judges are already tasked with making judgments about the 
admissibility of evidence such as police-generated lay witness testimony.  
Rule 104(a) gives courts a gatekeeping function for questions of evidentiary 
admissibility.
308
  Indeed, the courts perform this function in passing on the 
constitutionality of confessions and eyewitness identifications.  The hearsay 
rules, which clearly admit out-of-court statements identifying a person or 
statements made by an opposing party, render any hearsay objection 
pointless.  If there were such a non-frivolous hearsay objection to be made, 
the decision would be left solely to the court under the operation of Rule 
104. 
One might imagine a different set of hearsay rules that actually 
required courts to determine whether the statements were obtained in such a 
way as to render the statements trustworthy.  Our growing awareness of the 
reliability problems with police-generated lay witness testimony justifies 
the adoption of new hearsay rules of this type.  Any hearsay rules that 
would require these types of testimony to demonstrate guarantees of 
trustworthiness would require trial courts to make the determination. 
Courts routinely pass judgment on whether witness statements fit 
various hearsay exceptions, and these determinations require courts to 
evaluate the circumstances under which witnesses made their statements.  
 
306 See NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 77.  Natapoff notes that innocent people with criminal 
associations or criminal records are at special risk of targeting by lying informants because 
“law enforcement and jurors alike are predisposed to believe in their guilt.”  Id. at 72. 
307 Natapoff analogizes police informants to expert witnesses.  She argues that both types 
of witnesses are paid for their testimony, they purport to have a unique type of insider 
information, and their reliability can be difficult for jurors to evaluate.  Id. at 195. 
308 Rule 104(a) provides: “The court must decide any preliminary question about whether 
a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible.  In so deciding, the court 
is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.”  FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
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For example, the hearsay exception for excited utterances applies to the 
statements of children who are victims of abuse.
309
  These statements are 
typically made to adult relatives, social service workers, or physicians who 
are called to testify at trial.  Under the rule, the courts must determine 
whether the statement was “made while the declarant was under the stress 
of excitement [caused by the startling event or condition].”
310
  The 
reliability justification for an exception to the hearsay rule is that “a 
condition of excitement . . . temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and 
produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.”
311
  It is beyond 
peradventure that the task belongs to trial courts to determine the state of 
mind of the declarant, the child victim, to determine whether the child 
uttered the statement under circumstances that provide guarantees of 
trustworthiness.  Moreover, trial courts have relied on their knowledge of 
child development regarding the reactions of young children to sexual 
assault in finding that the excitement or alarm caused by such an event will 
be prolonged in younger children as opposed to adults.
312
  Although not 
specifically required as elements of the excited utterance exception, courts 
have also noted other indicia of reliability, such as corroborating evidence 
of injury to the child and the fact that the child exhibits knowledge of 
sexual matters usually unknown to children of that age.
313
  Countless 
similar examples can be given of the traditional fact-finding done by trial 
courts in performing evidentiary gatekeeping to determine whether 




Thus, Rule 104(a) places on trial courts the primary responsibility for 
determining the admissibility of almost all forms of evidence.
315
  To be 
 
309 See FED. R. EVID. 803(2); see, e.g., United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (holding that hearsay statements of child victim of sexual assault were admissible 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2)). 
310 Id. 
311 FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee’s note. 
312 See, e.g., Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 504 (6th Cir. 2003).  In Bugh, the Third 
Circuit noted a “clear judicial trend in Ohio to recognize a liberalization of the requirements 
for an excited utterance when applied to young children victimized by sexual assaults.”  Id. 
(quoting State v. Bugh, No. 594, 1991 WL 38013, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. March 14, 1991).  
The Sixth Circuit also commented approvingly of the Ohio appellate court’s reliance on 
another of its decisions, in which it found the “‘limited reflective powers of a three-year-old’ 
and the lack of motive or reflective capacities to prevaricate the circumstances of an attack, 
as supporting the trustworthiness of a child’s communications to others.”  Id. (citing State v. 
Wagner, 508 N.E.2d 164, 167 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986)). 
313 Id.; see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 222, § 8.36, at 808. 
314 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 222, § 1.10, at 31–37. 
315 Rule 104(b) carves out a narrow set of issues as to which the jury is said to make final 
determinations of “admissibility.”  The types of issues include evidence that is conditionally 
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admissible, hearsay statements such as eyewitness testimony, police 
testimony about a suspect’s interrogation, and informant testimony should 
carry circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.  The task of determining 
reliability would fall to the trial courts in the course of determining 
admissibility.  Unfortunately, the hearsay rules fail to provide any check for 
reliability, but this does not relieve the court of providing such reliability 
screening upon request. 
In sum, Rules 701 and 403 grant trial courts the discretion to conduct 
hearings to determine the admissibility of evidence that is both powerful  
and hard for jurors to evaluate for reliability.  The refusal to exercise that 
discretion in conducting reliability hearings for police-generated lay witness 
testimony should constitute an abuse of discretion. 
C. ASSESSING THE RELIABILITY OF POLICE-GENERATED WITNESS 
TESTIMONY 
Each of the three types of police-generated lay witness testimony 
considered here presents different types of contamination risks, different 
considerations regarding proper documentation, and other distinct 
considerations regarding subject vulnerabilities and suggestive or coercive 
practices.  Thus, in ruling on admissibility, courts would need to consider 
these different factors and the degree to which each bears on reliability for 
the particular type of evidence at issue. 
As a general matter, we can identify four critical issues that should be 
addressed for each type of evidence. 
First, the record of the witness’s statement must be adequate.  Did the 
police videotape the entirety of the interrogation, the interview with the 
eyewitness, or the interview with the informant?  Did they photograph or 
videotape the lineup, photo array, or show-up? 
Second, the record must show that the witness’s statement is not 
contaminated or otherwise tainted.  Did the police use suggestive or 
coercive means in obtaining an eyewitness’s identification, a suspect’s 
confession, or an informant’s testimony?  Was a blind administrator used to 
conduct the identification procedure?  Did the police provide so great an 
inducement to a potential informant as to create an undue risk of perjury? 
Third, the witness must not have been especially prone to making a 
false statement.  To what extent was the eyewitness, suspect, or informant 
vulnerable to police suggestion or coercion due to youth, intellectual 
 
relevant, authenticity, and whether a witness has sufficient personal knowledge.  See  id. 
§ 1.13, at 45–49.  None of these issues can be said to have a bearing on a reliability 
assessment of police-generated lay witness testimony. 
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disability, mental illness, risk of deportation or prosecution, trauma or fear 
induced by crime victimization, etc.? 
Fourth, other evidence must corroborate the witness’s statement.  Are 
other indicators of trustworthiness present, such as reliable corroborating 
evidence on the issue for which the testimony is offered?  Did the 
interrogation or informant statement lead to new evidence such as stolen 
items or a murder weapon, for example?  If an eyewitness identification is 
offered, to what extent does the initial description of the subject match the 
characteristics of the defendant?  Do other factors such as the presence of a 
weapon or high stress indicate that the identification may be unreliable? 
Obviously, each type of evidence presents different dangers, and 
experts have outlined more refined sets of best practices to guard against 
those dangers. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Henderson provides an 
excellent roadmap for lower courts in how to conduct a pretrial reliability 
hearing for eyewitness identification testimony.
316
  Upon motion by the 
defense, trial courts should hold pretrial hearings to consider all relevant 
factors that have a bearing on the reliability of eyewitness identification.  
The court’s decision catalogues all the relevant “estimator” variables that 
courts should consider, such as whether the witness made the viewing under 
high stress, whether a weapon was visible during a brief encounter, the 
witness’s age, whether the witness was highly intoxicated, and whether the 
witness and defendant were of different races, among numerous others.
317
  
Courts should consider “system variables” (variables under the control of 
the state) including whether a live or photo lineup was conducted following 
“blind” procedures, whether the witness was given proper pre-lineup 
instructions, whether the live or photo lineup was properly constructed of 
look-alikes and a minimum of five fillers, whether the administrator 
avoided giving confirmatory feedback, whether the witness’s confidence 
level in the identification was recorded, and whether a witness was asked to 
view a suspect more than once during an investigation.
318
  With regard to 
show-ups, the court determined that show-ups held more than two hours 
after an event present a heightened risk of misidentification, and 
administrators should provide instructions to witnesses prior to all show-
ups.  Overall, the court expressed a preference for lineups but did not forbid 
show-ups under these circumstances.
319
  Consistent with its prior decisions, 
 
316 See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 920–21 (N.J. 2011); see also State v. Chen, 27 
A.3d 930 (N.J. 2011) (companion case applying Henderson under state rules of evidence to 
eyewitness identifications tainted by private-party suggestiveness). 
317 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921–22. 
318 Id. at 895. 
319 Id. at 903–04. 
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identification administrators are required to “make a full record—written or 




The Henderson decision limits a defendant’s right to such a hearing to 
only those cases that involve suggestiveness.  If a case does involve 
suggestiveness (a system variable), the lower courts are instructed to 
consider both estimator and system variables.  At the hearing, “a defendant 
can cross-examine eyewitnesses and police officials and present witnesses 
and other relevant evidence linked to system and estimator variables.”
321
 
Presumably, the defendant might be permitted to call expert witnesses at the 
hearing if appropriate.  If only estimator variables are raised, then the 
defendant is not entitled to a hearing.
322
  Given the substantially broader 
considerations as compared to the previous due process analysis, the court 
also found that defendants were entitled to greater pretrial discovery.
323
  To 
prevail, defendants must meet the high burden of demonstrating that the 
identification poses “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.”
324
  Even in cases in which the identification is admitted, 
however, the ruling envisions an expanded use of jury instructions, both at 
the end of the trial and during the trial.
325
 
The Henderson framework will be criticized by some for not going far 
enough and by others for going too far.  In general, however, it gives 
substance to the proposal made in this Article that courts should conduct 
pretrial reliability hearings for police-generated lay witness testimony such 
as identifications, confessions, and informant testimony.  State supreme 
courts can implement such hearings on a statewide basis by adapting their 
 
320 Id. at 900. 
321 Id. at 920. 
322 A defendant has the initial burden to show evidence of suggestiveness that could lead 
to mistaken identification.  Id. at 916–17.  Thus, reliability concerns based only on estimator 
variables—no matter to what extent those variables indicate the identification is unreliable—
do not entitle a defendant to a hearing under this ruling.  The court justified this limitation in 
part on pragmatic concerns about overwhelming the court system with demands for hearings 
and on the preference for judicial oversight in matters over which the police might be 
deterred from acting improperly.  Id. at 923–24.  The court also relied on a notion (refuted in 
this Article) that jurors, and not trial courts, should engage in fact-finding regarding the 
reliability of a witness’s statements.  Id. at 923.  Ironically, the court states that it would be 
inappropriate for a trial court to find an identification unreliable solely on the ground, for 
example, that the witness was under “‘too much’ stress.”  Id.  But this is precisely the type of 
fact that courts decide all the time in determining whether a witness made a statement while 
still under the stress of an event so as to qualify as an “excited utterance.”  See supra notes 
310–12 and accompanying text. 
323 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922–23. 
324 Id. at 920. 
325 Id. at 925.  As a result, the court saw a reduced need for expert witnesses at trial.  Id. 
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due process provisions in the manner done in New Jersey.  Legislatures 
might also provide a statutory framework for such hearings.  At the end of 
the day, however, the rules of evidence provide trial courts with the 
discretion to conduct extensive pretrial reliability screening for hearsay 
evidence, and they require courts to apply the rules so as to promote the 
growth and development of the law of evidence and safeguard the integrity 
and fairness of the trial process. 
D. THE APPROPRIATENESS OF JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING 
The jury system gives lay people an important participatory role, 
designed to protect the accused, in the criminal justice system.  The 
theoretical basis for the jury trial is that jurors serve as a bulwark to protect 
against oppressive misuse of the prosecution power by the government.
326
  
By screening evidence for reliability, judges enhance the ability of the jury 
to protect the interests of the defendant.  The jury’s purpose, after all, is to 
protect the “fairness of the proceeding,”
327
 and excluding unreliable 
prosecution evidence does not in any way interfere with the defendant’s 
right to have the jury render a verdict on the facts.
328
  As trials are currently 
structured, courts may refuse to enter a judgment of guilt if it is contrary to 
the great weight of the evidence, which may take into account the 
credibility of witnesses, but a judge may not convict when a jury finds the 
defendant not guilty.  If a witness’s testimony or the confession of a 
defendant is so tainted by suggestion or coercion as to render it unreliable, 
judges already have the authority to set aside a guilty verdict.
329
  Thus, the 
trial court’s role as currently defined already gives the courts enormous 
discretion in aiding the jury in its role to protect the defendant from an 
incorrect verdict.  In federal courts and some other jurisdictions, judges are 
also empowered to comment to the jury on the weight of the evidence, 
 
326 See JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA at xiii (1988) (“Thomas Jefferson and 
others have seen [the jury] as the public’s line of defense against the state when it acts 
oppressively, and Jefferson, for that reason, once declared that the right to a trial by jury was 
more precious to the maintenance of a democracy than even the right to vote.”). 
327 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES & JURY TRIALS, princ. 1 & cmt. 
B, at 1–3 (2005). 
328 Recent case law on the right to a jury trial protects the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to have a jury decide factual issues that establish elements of the offense or that 
increase the maximum punishment for the offense.  See supra note 29. 
329 See Ceci & Friedman, supra note 215, at 107 (addressing the possible role of the trial 
judge to refuse to enter judgment on a verdict of guilty if a child witness’s statement or 
testimony is so tainted by suggestion that a guilty verdict cannot stand, and suggesting that 
such a ruling should be rare). 
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Understanding the factors that diminish the reliability of police-
generated witness testimony is not a matter of common sense.  For 
example, past studies showed that even judges do not have the expertise to 
evaluate the factors that affect an eyewitness identification’s reliability.
331
  
Recent case law suggests at least some efforts by the judiciary to be better 
informed.
332
  The development of such expertise by trial courts would 
enable them to make accurate findings at pretrial reliability hearings.  
Developing such expertise should already be a goal of judicial training.  
Similar training could raise judicial awareness of recurring problems with 
confessions and the use of informants as well.  Expertise in these three 
forms of evidence would equip courts as a practical matter to rule on 
motions and to enter judgment on verdicts of guilt.  More importantly, 
judges need the expertise to fulfill their ethical obligations to ensure the 
fairness of the trial process.
333
  It also goes without saying that it is not 
feasible to provide this training to jurors during the course of a trial and 
expect individual jurors to develop anything close to genuine expertise. 
Judicial findings at pretrial reliability hearings have the advantage of 
creating public awareness about the standards of evidentiary reliability 
pertaining to police-generated witness testimony.  Judicial rulings on the 
record also make appellate review possible,
334
 unlike decisions by 
individual juries whose errors cannot be corrected.  Appellate review 
creates a jurisprudence informed by expert-witness testimony and outside 
research that could lead to the development of doctrines consistent with 
social science.
335
  The development of such doctrines can effectively require 
 
330 Id. at 106. 
331 See CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 83, at 175 (summarizing survey studies and 
concluding that judges are generally insensitive to factors that influence eyewitness 
identification accuracy). 
332 See Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 623–30. 
333 See Backus, supra note 43, at 961–71; Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 
632 n.180.  Some judges have also invoked their supervisory authority to ensure the fairness 
of the adversary system.  See id. at 622. 
334 Creating a coherent body of law with mandatory appellate review was one of the 
goals that animated the development of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  See Susan R. 
Klein & Sandra Guerra Thompson, DOJ’s Attack on Federal Judicial “Leniency,” the 
Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Criminal Sentencing, 44 TULSA L. REV. 519, 
521–22 (2009). 
335 See Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, at 633 (addressing state courts that 
have engaged in jurisprudential development of eyewitness identifications by taking judicial 
notice of social science research and developments in other jurisdictions); cf. Cheng, supra 
note 12, at 1281–84 (addressing the importance of independent judicial research to accurate 
admissibility decisions on scientific evidence). 
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the police to follow best practices.
336
  Legislation has already begun to 
move in this direction in many jurisdictions, but the progress has been 
slow.
337
  The judiciary can play an important role as a catalyst for these 
necessary changes. 
Public judicial pronouncements demanding greater reliability of the 
trial process so as to avoid wrongful convictions can also further the 
educational goals of the criminal justice system.  Courts play an essential 
role in giving voice to the values of our society.
338
  Whereas today the 
public trial answers only the question of the defendant’s guilt, pretrial 
reliability hearings would provide a public airing of the government’s key 
evidence and necessitate a judicial declaration of reliability determined by 
reference to best practices.  The process would give substance to the values 
espoused in the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial. 
V. CONCLUSION 
One former prosecutor responsible for sending an innocent man to 
prison for twenty-seven years sums up the reliability conundrum posed by 
faulty, uncorroborated testimonial evidence: 
In the criminal justice system, people are being convicted on one-witness cases.  And 
what this says to me is we’ve got an inherent problem about how many of these cases 
we’re getting wrong.  And it’s still going on today . . . .  My question to everybody 
involved in this across the state and across the nation is what are we going to do about 
this?  I don’t know.
339
 
Clearly, heartfelt apologies and handwringing are not enough.
340
  
Eyewitness identifications, confessions, and police-informant testimony 
 
336 I have previously written about the important doctrinal breakthroughs at the state 
level in the area of eyewitness identifications.  See Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 36, 
at 623–30.  These breakthroughs have been based on state constitutional law, the court’s 
supervisory authority, and state evidence rules.  Id. at 622. 
337 See supra notes 133–39 and accompanying text. 
338 See generally DAVID R. DOW, AMERICA’S PROPHETS: HOW JUDICIAL ACTIVISM MAKES 
AMERICA GREAT (2009). 
339 John Council, Witnesses to the Prosecution: Current and Former ADAs Who Helped 
Convict Exonerated Men Reflect, TEX. LAW., June 9, 2008, at 1 (quoting former Dallas 
prosecutor James Fry). 
340 Not surprisingly, wrongly convicted persons receive apologies from judges, mistaken 
eyewitnesses, and even the true perpetrators.  See, e.g., Jennifer Peltz, Imprisoned Man 
Falsely Accused of Rape Wins Release and Apology from Judge, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 11, 2009, at 
1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202436239965&
Imprisoned_Man_Falsely_Accused_of_Rape_Wins_Release_and_Apology_From_Judge; 
Judge Apologizes, Ends ‘16-Year Nightmare’: Man Wrongly Convicted of Bludgeoning Wife, 
Killing Unborn Child, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1996, at 17, available at 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-06-22/news/9606220178_1_dianna-d-aiello-kevin-
lee-green-unsolved-slayings; Rape Victim Apologizes to Wrongfully Convicted Man, 
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present serious reliability problems, especially when the evidence is 
obtained from vulnerable individuals by coercive or suggestive means.  The 
rules of evidence have traditionally viewed these types of problematic 
evidence as presumptively admissible without necessity for individualized 
reliability screening.  The process leaves it solely to juries to reject any 
unreliable evidence.  As the scores of DNA exonerations have shown, these 
types of prosecution evidence are fraught with dangers of unreliability that 
juries are unable to detect.  Indeed, concerns about sentencing innocent 
people to death on the basis of faulty evidence has already prompted the 
recent abolition of the death penalty in New Mexico and Illinois,
341
 and the 
adoption of the country’s most restrictive death penalty statute in 
Maryland.
342
  Unless we find ways to improve the quality of police-
generated witness testimony, the criminal justice system will continue to 
convict the innocent. 
The exclusion or limitation of unreliable prosecution evidence protects 
the innocent by ensuring the integrity of the trial process.  A trial based on 
critical and unreliable evidence is simply unfair.  It is no wonder that so 
many innocent people have been mistakenly convicted.  Preventing 
wrongful convictions also furthers the important public safety goal of 
incapacitating dangerous individuals.  As is often noted, when an innocent 
person is wrongly convicted, a guilty person remains at large, free to 
commit additional crimes.
343
  Not only do more accurate investigative 
procedures prevent miscarriages of justice, but they also lead to the capture 
and punishment of the truly guilty individuals who might otherwise escape 
apprehension. 
 
WRAL.COM (May 14, 2008), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/2862438/; True 
Perpetrator Apologizes to Wrongly Convicted Man, NBC DFW (Apr. 16, 2009), 
http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/True-Perpetrator-Apologizes-To-Wrongly-Convicted-
Man--.html; see also Abigail Penzell, Apology in the Context of Wrongful Conviction: Why 
the System Should Say It’s Sorry, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 145 (2007) (advocating 
apology as a psychological tool to promote healing for victim, exonerated individuals, and 
the community). 
341 See Deanna Bellandi, Lawmakers: Ill. Governor. to Abolish Death Penalty, ABC 
NEWS (Mar. 9, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13091185 (reporting that 
Illinois had abolished the death penalty and noting that New Mexico had done the same in 
2009). 
342 See Millemann, supra note 8, at 272–75 (noting that concern about convicting the 
innocent was one reason for new restrictions). 
343 See e.g., N.Y. STATE JUST. TASK FORCE, http://www.nyjusticetaskforce.com/
mission.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (including in their mission statement “public 
safety” and recognizing in their task force description that “[w]rongful convictions . . . allow 
the actual perpetrator of the crime to go unpunished”); Causes of Wrongful Conviction, NEW 
ENG. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.newenglandinnocence.org/knowledge-center/causes/ 
(“Nobody benefits from a wrongful conviction—except the real perpetrator who remains 
free to commit additional crimes.”). 
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